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Abstract
This Note examines whether the current initiatives to deregulate export controls on computer
and telecommunications to Russia pose threats to U.S. national security. Part I reviews the devel-
opment of unilateral and multilateral controls that prevented the exportation of dual-use commodi-
ties to the former Soviet Union. Part II describes the current political and economic situation in
Russia. Part II then discusses recent deregulation and pending legislation in the U.S. Congress that
would further reduce the controls on computer and telecommunications exports to Russia. Part II
also sets forth the arguments for and against deregulation. Part III argues that the instability in
Russia warrants the continued restriction of dual-use technology to Russia in order to protect U.S.
surveillance efforts and prevent the Russian government from using the technology for military
purposes. This Note concludes that the United States must devise an export policy toward Russia
that balances the need to eliminate export controls that are hindering U.S. economic competitive-
ness with U.S. security interests.
DEREGULATING DUAL-USE EXPORTS TO RUSSIA: IS U.S.
NATIONAL SECURIIY AT RISK?
Rochelle M. Tarlowe*
INTRODUCTION
During the Cold War,1 in order to protect its security inter.-
ests, the United States sought to restrict exports of dual-use com-
modities2 to the Soviet Union.- To further this objective, the
United States and its allies4 formed the Coordinating Committee
for Multilateral Export Control ("COCOM").' Each COCOM
member nation implemented COCOM's regulations through its
own export control system.6 In the United States, export con-
trols are governed by the Export Administration Act ("EAA").7
* J.D. Candidate, 1996, Fordham University.
1. See KARL W. RYAVEc, UNrrED STATES-SOVIT RELATIONS 46 (1989). The Cold War
was a period of rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union during which
each nation attempted to weaken the other without waging an outright war. Id. The
term is broadly used to define U.S.-Soviet Relations. Id. at 47.
2. See Philip H. Oettinger, Comment, National Discretion: Choosing COCOM's Succes-
sor and the New Export Administration Act, 9 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'y 559, 567 (1994).
Dual-use commodities are items that have civilian uses but also have military applica-
tions. Machine tools, computers, telecommunications, lasers, electronics equipment,
and aerospace equipment are examples of controlled dual-use commodities. 15 C.F.R.
§ 799.1 (Supp. 1 1994).
3. John F. McKenzie, Implementation of the Core List ofExport Controls: Computer and
Software Controls, 5 SoFrwmm LJ. 1 (1992). The policy of restricting exports that could
prove to be detrimental to the national security of the United States is codified in the
Export Administration Act. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(2) (A) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
4. 15 C.F.R. § 770.2 (1994). The members of the Coordinating Committee for
Multilateral Export Controls were Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Id.
5. See WnitAm J. LONG, U.S. EXPORT CONTROL PoLIcY. ExExcrriv AuToNoMY vs.
CoNGREssioNMA Rrom 17 (1989). COCOM was founded in 1949 as an international
effort to control the transfer of defense technologies the by member states to potential
enemy nations. Id. COCOM was not established through any formal treaty. Cecil
Hunt, COCOM and Other International Cooperation in Export Control, in COPING WIm Ex.
PORT CONTRoLs 1988, at 109, 112 (PLI Comm. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series
No. 453, 1988). Export controls are implemented subject to unanimous consent by all
COCOM members. Id. COCOM controlled strategic exports to the Soviet Union, Hun-
gary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, East Germany, Romania, Albania, North Korea,
Mongolia, Vietnam, and the People's Republic of China. Id. at 112-13.
6. PAUL B. STEPHAN III Er. AL, INTERNATIONAL BusINESS Am ECONOMICS LAw AND
PoLCY 422 (1993) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL TRADE].
7. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The EAA restricts exports
based on national security, foreign policy, and short supply concerns. Id. §§ 2404-2406.
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The fall of the Soviet government in December 19918
prompted U.S. technological industries to criticize controls on
dual-use exports such as computers and telecommunications
equipment to Russia.9 Supporters of U.S. business interests as-
serted that eliminating export restrictions to the former Soviet
Union would create investment opportunities while assisting in
the development of democracy and capitalism in the region.10
Furthermore, they argued, controls did not protect U.S. security
interests because the controlled exports were available to Russia
from sources other than the United States."
With the disbanding of COCOM in March 1994, former
members were free to regulate export controls unilaterally.1 2
U.S. President Bill Clinton thereafter modified licensing require-
ments to permit exports of certain telecommunications and
computer equipment previously prohibited for export to Rus-
The EAA subjects exports to licensing requirements. IwiuRanoNAL TRADE, supra note
6, at 422. Pursuant to the EAA the Department of Commerce issues control lists for
restricted exports. Id. In addition to the EAA, the Arms Export Control Act limits the
export of military technology. Id.; 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
8. See Francis X. Clines, End of the Soviet Union; Gorbachev, Last Soviet Leaden Resigns;
U.S. Recognizes Repulics' Independence, N.Y. TnMEs, Dec. 26, 1991, at Al (reporting on
resignation of Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev, and formation of Commonwealth of
Independent States consisting of Russia and ten other former Soviet Republics).
9. See Export Controls on Advanced Telecommunications: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On
Economic Policy, Trade and Environment of House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. 14-15 (1993) [hereinafter Telecommunications Hearings] (testimony of Robert Allen,
Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer, AT&T) (testifying that Cold War
export controls will jeopardize billions of dollars in telecommunications sales to Rus-
sia); see also Reuriting theExport Administration Act: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Economic
Policy, Trade, and Environment of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
73 (1993) [hereinxafter EAA Hearings] (testimony of Dr. Paul Freedenberg, of Baker &
Botts, L.L.P., on Behalf of Computer and Business Equipment Manufacturers Associa-
tion) (advocating new U.S. export'poicy that recognizes changes in U.S. relations with
Russia and pace of technological change).
10. Telecommunications Hearings, supra note 9, at 13-16; see Shahid Alam, Restructur.
ing the United States' Export Legislation for the Post-Cold War Era, 18 FLErCHER F. WoRLD
AFF. 137, 143 (1994) (stating United States should respond to Russian President Boris
Yeltsin's request to obtain Western technology).
11. See Peter S. Malloy, Controls on the Export of Military Sensitive Technology: National
Security Imperative or U.S. Industry Impediment?, 18 RutrGEm ComurTER & TEcH. L.J. 841,
842 (1992) (arguing United States should not limit exports that are available to con-
trolled destinations from other nations).
12. Export Controls: U.S. Li/ts Curbs on High-Tech Exports Including Telecom Equipment,
Computers, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at 530 (Apr. 6, 1994) [hereinafter U.S.
Lifts Curbs]. The dissolution of COCOM left all licensing decisions of former members
to "national discretion." Id.
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sia.'3 In addition, members of the U.S. Congress seek to amend
the EAA to eliminate many of the remaining controls on dual-
use exports to Russia.1 4
While U.S. businesses support legislation to deregulate ex-
port controls on dual-use technology to Russia15 critics of dereg-
ulation argue that relaxing export controls will harm U.S. secur-
ity interests." After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Rus-
sian government has experienced difficulties in maintaining
economic and political stability.' Meanwhile, Russia still pos-
sesses a vast nuclear arsenal.' Opponents of deregulation assert
that exporting advanced computer and telecommunications
equipment will hinder the ability of the United States to monitor
Russia' 9 while providing a potential ultra-nationalist Russian
13. Id. President Clinton eliminated controls on all but the most sophisticated
telecommunications equipment and certain computer equipment. I& The deregula-
tions were implemented through the creation of the "GLX," a new general license. 15
C.F.R. § 771.20 (1994).
14. See H.R. 2912, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 3431, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993); H.R. 3627, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 3534, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993); H.R. 3937, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); S. 1617, 103d Cong., lst Sess. (1993); S.
1820, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); S. 1838, 103d Cong.; 2d Sess. (1994) (seeking to
amend EAA to deregulate telecommunications and computer exports to Russia and
other nations).
15. See, e.g., EAA Hearings, supra note 9, at 107 (testimony of Boyd McKelvian, Se-
nior Manager for International Trade Regulation, International Law and Policy, Gen-
eral Electric Company) (complementing legislators who have proposed bills to elimi-
nate export controls on telecommunications and computers).
16. See Juan P. Morillo, The Clinton Administration's New National Export Policy, 25
Lw & Poucy INT'L Bus. 1113, 1120-22 (1994) (enumerating threats deregulation of
export pose to national security).
17. See U.S. Policy Toward the New Independent States: Hearing Before the House Comm.
on Foreign Affairs, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1994) [hereinafter Policy Toward NIS] (state-
ment of Hon. Lee H. Hamilton [D-IN], Chairman of Comm. on Foreign Affairs) (stat-
ing influence of ultra-nationalists in Russian parliament and economic setbacks in Rus-
sia); see also Stephen F. Cohen, Clinton's Yeltsin, Yelsin's Russia, NATION, Oct. 10, 1994, at
373 (commenting on Yeltsin's unpopularity among Russian people).
18. Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States and Its Interests
Abroad. Hearing Before the Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 22-23
(1994) [hereinafter Security Hearings] (prepared statement of Lt. Gen. James R. Clap-
per,Jr., USAF, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency). The Russian government main-
tains 27,000 nuclear warheads. Id.
19. See Christopher A. Padilla, The Telecommunications Core Lis" A Study in Dual
Personality, in CoPING Wrm ExPoRT ComROLs 1992, at 111, 116 (PU Comm. L. & Prac-
tice Course Handbook Series No. 606, 1992) [hereinafter Dual Personality] (stating U.S.
National Security Agency has been opposed to exporting telecommunications technol-
ogy to Russia because modernized network would make it more difficult to gather intel-
ligence through wiretapping).
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leader with the technologies to enhance Russia's military capa-
bilities.20
This Note examines whether the current initiatives to der-
egulate export controls on computer and telecommunications to
Russia pose threats to U.S. national security. Part I reviews the
development of unilateral and multilateral controls that pre-
vented the exportation of dual-use commodities to the former
Soviet Union. Part II describes the current political and eco-
nomic situation in Russia. Part II then discusses recent deregula-
tion and pending legislation in the U.S. Congress that would fur-
ther reduce the controls on computer and telecommunications
exports to Russia. Part II also sets forth the arguments for and
against deregulation. Part IJI argues that the instability in Russia
warrants the continued restriction of dual-use technology to Rus-
sia in order to protect U.S. surveillance efforts and prevent the
Russian government from using the technology for military pur-
poses. This Note concludes that the United States must devise
an export policy toward Russia that balances the need to elimi-
nate export controls that are hindering U.S. economic competi-
tiveness with U.S. security interests.
I. EXPORT CONTROLS ON DUAL-USE ITEMS FROM THE
COLD WAR UNTIL THE FALL OF THE SOVIET
UNION
Prior to the Cold War, modern day export controls only ex-
isted during wartime. 21 The decline of U.S.-Soviet relations fol-
lowing World War ]122 led the United States to implement exten-
20. See Security Hearings, supra note 18, at 22 (stating that political power of ultra-
nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky is cause for concern); see also Paul H. Nitze, Foreward:
International Security in a New World, 81 GEo. Lj. 481, 483-84 (1994) (asserting Russia's
political instability and potential to 'make mischief in trouble spots worldwide' raises
cause for concern).
21. Raymond J. Waldmann, Trade and Technology Transfer. Constraints and Limita-
tions, in NATIONAL SEcURrrY LAw 1138 (John Norton Moore et. al. eds. 1990). Modern
day wartime export controls began with the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917. Id.;
50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The act prohibits trading with any indi-
vidual, partnership, corporation, resident, or government of any nation with which the
United States is at War. Id. § 3.
22. See ROBERT F. ByaRNs, U.S. Poucy TowARD EAsMRN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET
UNION 16 (1989). In 1945-47, the first two years following World War II, the United
States attempted to maintain friendly relations with the Soviet Union. Id. As Soviet
power spread into Eastern Europe, thereby threatening Western Europe, however, the
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sive peacetime export restrictions.23  Beginning in 1949, the
United States limited the flow of goods and technology to the
Soviet Union24 and, in conjunction with it allies,25 established
export controls on a multilateral level.26 Since 1949, U.S. export
laws were revised on repeated occasions. 2 1 In 1991, the United
States and COCOM responded to the fall of communism in East-
ern Europe by revising the list of controlled commodities and
controlled destinations. 28
A. The Establishment of Cold War Export Restrictions
In 1949, the U.S. Congress passed the Export Control Act2 9
("ECA"), the first comprehensive export law enacted in the
United States to restrict the exportation of commercial goods
and technologyA0 The ECA was primarily instituted to control
exports to the Soviet Union and other communist nations that
might harm U.S. security interests."' Although the ECA was
United States sought to contain the Soviet threat through unifying the Western coun-
tries. Id.
23. Waldmann, supra note 21, at 1138-39. The Export Control Act of 1949 re-
stricted exports on goods and technology. Ch. 11, 63 Stat. 7 (1949) (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 2021-2023 (expired 1969)). The Mutual Defense Act of 1951
permitted the State Department to enter into multilateral agreements to prevent goods
from reaching the Soviet Union. Ch. 575, 65, Stat. 644 (1951) (codified as amended 22
U.S.C. §§ 1611-1613). The Mutual Security Act of 1954 allowed the State Department
to control arms exports. Ch. 936, 68, Stat. 832 (1954) (codified as amended at 22
U.S.C. §§ 1750-1753a (repealed 1961)).
24. Export Control Act, ch. 11, 63 Stat. 7 (1949) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.
§§ 2021-2023 (expired 1969)). The Export Control Act gave the President the author-
ity to "prohibit or curtail the exportation from the United States, its Territories, and
possessions, of any articles, materials, or supplies, including technical data except
under such rules and regulations as he shall prescribe." Id.
25. See supra note 4 (listing members of COCOM).
26. LJ. KurN & B.C. MuRP-, AN OVERVIEW OF UwmTn STATES ExPoRT CON-
TROTs 4 (1989) [hereinafter OVERVIEW OF ExPoRT CoNTmors]. In the 1950's the United
States and its allies established COCOM to control exports to communist countries. I&
27. See id. at 4-5 (enumerating amendments to Export Administration Act during
1970's and 1980's).
28. McKenzie, supra note 3, at 2. The United States amended the Commerce Con-
trol List to comply with the multilaterally agreed to deregulations. See 15 C.F.R. § 799.1
(Supp. 1 1994) (deregulating export controls to Poland, Hungary, and Czech Repub-
lic).
29. Ch. 11, 63 Stat. 7 (1949) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 2021-2023 (ex-
pired 1969)).
30. OvERvIw OF EXPORT CoNmoLs, supra note 26, at 3-4.
31. Id. "The Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of the United States to
use export controls to the extent necessary... to exercise the necessary vigilance over
export from the standpoint of their significance to the national security." Export Con-
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drafted to expire in 1951,52 Congress repeatedly renewed the
ECA until 1969.33
To prevent strategic exports from reaching the Soviet
Union on a multilateral level, the United States, with its allies,
organized COCOM in 1949.14 Based in Paris, COCOM operated
as an informal trade control coordinating mechanism.35 Each
member nation provided representation at weekly COCOM
meetings.5 6 COCOM representatives established the criteria for
the controls, developed embargo lists, and coordinated enforce-
ment efforts among the member nations.3 7
One of COCOM's central purposes was to devise export
controls for dual-use commodities, software, and technical data
to the Soviet Union and its allies."8 COCOM's Industrial List
served to restrict exports of such commodities that had both mil-
itary and civilian applications.-9 The Industrial List was then in-
corporated into each COCOM member nation's own export
control system.40
B. The Export Administration Act and Regulatory Provisions
In the United States, dual-use exports are governed by the
Export Administration Act ("EAA") of 197941 and its subsequent
amendments.42 The EAA of 1979 evolved from the ECA of
trol Act, ch. 11, 63 Stat. 7. The ECA also controlled goods in short supply and restricted
goods that furthered foreign policy objectives. Id. Short supply controls enabled the
United States to make the transition from a wartime to a peacetime economy and to
rebuild the European economies. OVERVIEW OF EXPORT CONTROLS, supra note 26, at 3-
4.
32. Ch. 11, 63 Stat. 7, 9.
33. Waldmann, supra note 21, at 1138; see Ch. 83, 65 Stat. 43 (1951); Ch. 116, 67
Stat. 62 (1953); Ch. 473, 70 Stat. 407 (1956); Pub. L. No. 85-466, 72 Stat. 220 (1958);
Pub. L. No 86-464, 74 Stat. 130 (1960); Pub. L. No. 87-515, 76 Stat 127 (1962); Pub. L.
No. 89-63, 79 Stat. 209 (1965); Pub. L. No. 91-35, 83 Stat. 42 (1969); Pub. L. No. 91-59,
83 Stat. 101 (1969); Pub. L No. 91-105, 83 Stat. 169 (1969) (all renewing ECA).
34. LONG, supra note 5, at 17.
35. Hunt, supra note 5, at 112. COCOM was not organized or governed by any
formal treaty or international agreement. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. McKenzie, supra note 3, at 1-2.
39. Id. at 2.
40. Id.
41. Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (1979) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app.
§§ 2401-2420 (1988 and Supp. V 1993)).
42. Pub. L. No. 99-64, Stat. 120 (1985) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 2401-
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1949.4 3 Pursuant to the EAA, the U.S. Department of Com-
merce 44 issues and enforces export controls.45
1. The Export Administration Act of 1979 and its Legislative
Antecedents
In 1969, the U.S. Congress passed the first Export Adminis-
tration Act.46 Promulgated during a period of detente between
the United States and the Soviet Union,47 the Export Adminis-
tration Act of 1969 sought to control only exports that could
make strategic military contributions thereby harming national
security.48 In addition, the Export Administration Act of 1969
recognized that overbroad export controls impair the interests
of U.S. businesses to export their goods abroad.49
In 1976, the relaxation of export controls to the Soviet
Union was countered by the Department of Defense Science
Board through its release of the Bucy Report.- In order to con-
trol the diminishing technological advantage of the United
States over communist countries, the Bucy Report urged the re-
2420); Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.
§§ 2401-2420).
43. See OVERVIEW OF EXPORT CONTROLS, supra note 26, at 3-5 (discussing various
revision of U.S. export legislation since 1949).
44. OFFICE OF THE FEDEML REGISTER, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL
158 (1994). The Department of Commerce, under the supervision of the Secretary of
Commerce, is responsible for promoting international trade, U.S. competitiveness in
the world economy, and technological advancement. Id. The Department of Com-
merce is part of the executive branch of the U.S. government, with the Secretary of
Commerce serving as a member of the President's cabinet. Id.
45. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403 (requiring Secretary of Commerce to issue licenses
and establish control lists).
46. The Export Administration Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-184, 83 Stat. 841 (1969)
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2413 (expired 1979)).
47. OVERVIEW OF ExpoRT CONTROLS, supra note 26, at 4. The relaxation of export
controls was also motivated by other COCOM nations feeling less threatened by the
Soviets. Waldmann, supra note 21, at 1139.
48. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(2) (A).
49. 1& § 2401(6).
50. DEFENSE ScIrENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON EXPORT OF U.S. TECHNOLOGY, AN
ANALYSIS OF EXPORT CONTROL OF U.S. TECHNOLOGY - A DOD PERSPECIVE, reprinted in
Transfer of Technoloy and the Dresser Industries Export Licensing Actions: Hearing Before the
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 33-89 (1978). J. Fred Bucy, Chairman of the Defense Science Task
Force on Export of U.S. Technology, led the investigation that yielded the findings in
the Department Of Defense's report. Id at 37-38.
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tention of U.S. export controls over technology,5' recom-
mending strict controls over costly research and manufacturing
information.2 The Bucy Report also introduced the concept of
military critical technologies.5 s
The EAA of 1979-4 replaced the Export Administration Act
of 1969 as the primary export control legislation. 55 As docu-
mented in the Export Administration Act of 1969,56 the policy of
the United States was to consider the effect of export controls on
U.S. businesses, limiting only exports that were essential to U.S.
security.5 Meanwhile, the United States sought to prevent com-
munist countries from gaining access to sophisticated technol-
ogy.58 To address the competing objectives of increasing techno-
logical exports to promote economic growth and the desire to
restrict communist access to advanced technologies,59 the EAA
of 1979 required the Department of Defense to establish a spe-
cialized control list entitled the Military Critical Technologies
List.60
2. Regulatory Measures and Licensing Provisions
To implement the EAA, the Department of Commerce is-
sued the Export Administration Regulations ("EAR")." Within
51. Id, at 47-48. The report stressed that exporting technological designs and
manufacturing expertise pose the greatest security concerns. I& at 51.
52. Id. at 59-64. The report recommended the retention of export controls to
maintain U.S. lead time in the development of strategic capabilities. I4 at 64.
58. Peter Swan, A Road Map to Undmtanding Eport Controls: National Secuiity in a
Changing GlobalEnvironment, 30 AM. Bus. L.J. 607, 622 (1993). The EAA of 1979 sought
to prevent the export of military critical technologies. Id.
54. P.L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (1979) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.c. app.
§§ 2401-2420 (1988 and Supp. V 1993)).
55. Swan, supra note 53, at 621.
56. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text (noting Export Administration
Act-of 1969 recognized negative impact export controls has on U.S. businesses).
57. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(2) (A).
58. Swan, supra note 53, at 622.
59. Id.
60. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(d). In establishing the Military Critical Technologies
list, the Secretary of Commerce is required to consult the Secretary of Defense. I&
§ 2404(d) (1). The Secretary of Defense is primarily responsible for determining if par-
ticular item is a military critical technology, placing emphasis on arrays of design, man-
ufacturing know-how, keystone design, and keystone equipment. 14 § 2404(d) (2).
The Military Critical Technologies list is then integrated into the Commerce Control
List. Id. § 2404(d)(4).
61. 15 C.F.R. §§ 730-799 (1994). The United States controls exports through the
Export Administration Regulations. OVERVIEW OF EXpORT CoNmOLS, supra note 26, at
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the Department of Commerce, the Bureau of Export Adminis-
tration ("BXA7) maintains and enforces the EAR.62 The central
provision of the EAR is the Commerce Control List ("CCL').63
The CCL includes all commodities controlled by the Depart-
ment of Commerce and indicates whether, and to what extent, a
commodity is controlled. 64 The CCL regulates exports by cate-
gorizing dual-use commodities, 65 establishing country groups, 66
and indicating the reason for the control. 7
Based on the CCL categorization, an export may require
either a general or a validated license, issued by the BXA.6 A
general license does not require written authorization.69 Con-
versely, a validated license7 * requires documentation."1 In addi-
tion, an exporter must apply for a validated license.72 The BXA
7. The EAR focus on transactions involving the actual shipping of goods or technology
from the United States to another country. Id.
62. Kimberly S. Dyslin, Reform of the Multilateral Export Control Mechanism For the
Twenty-Fint Century: Redefining "The Enemy" and "War", 10 B.U. INT'L LJ. 1, 14 (1992).
The BXA maintains the Commerce List which incorporates all items subject to export
controls. 15 C.F.R. § 799.1(a).
63. 15 C.F.R. § 799.1 (Supp. 1). The Commerce Control List was formerly called
the Commodity Control List. McKenzie, supra note 3, at 3. Unlike the Commodity
Control List, the new Commerce Control List integrated all the commodities, software,
and technical data that are subject to export controls. Id.
64. OvERvIEW OF EXPORT CoNTROLs, supra note 26, at 11. The CCL corresponded
with the COCOM's Industrial List. I'RrNATioL TRADE, supra note 6, at 422. The
CCL, however, was much more extensive than the Industrial List. Oettinger, supra note
2, at 571.
65. 15 C.F.R. § 799.1 (Supp. 1). The CCL is divided into ten categories: (1) Mater-
ials; (2) Materials Processing; (3) Electronics; (4) Computers; (5) Telecommunications
and Cryptography, (6) Sensors; (7) Avionics and Navigation; (8) Marine Technology;
(9) Propulsion Systems and Transportation Systems; and (10) Miscellaneous Items. Id.
§ 799.1.
66. See The Commerce Control List and How to Use It, 15 C.F.R. § 799.1 (explain-
ing how country's are divided into groups represented by the letters Q, S, T, V, W, Y, Z).
Russia is represented by the letterY. OvERvrEw OF ExPoRT CoNToLs, supra note 26, at
11.
67. 15 C.F.R. § 799.1(d) (1) (iii). Controls may be implemented for national secur-
ity, foreign policy, short supply, and other purposes. Id. Two letter symbols are used to
indicate the reason for the control. Id. For example, "NS" indicates a commodity is
controlled for national security purposes. Id.
68. Dyslin, supra note 62, at 15.
69. 15 C.F.R. § 771.1.
70. Id. § 772.2. Validated licenses may be granted for a specific export, project,
distribution, or chemical or biological equipment. Id § 772.2(b).
71. Id.
72. 15 C.F.R. § 772.4. Applications for validated licenses require detailed disclo-
sure. Id.
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then reviews each application, granting a validated license on a
case by case basis.7"
3. Subsequent Amendments to the EAA of 1979
In 1985, the Export Administration Amendments Act7 4
amended the EAA to eliminate export controls on goods freely
available from sources outside the United States.75 In determin-
ing the level of availability of a particular commodity from non-
U.S. sources, the foreign availability provision of the EAA 76 re-
quires the Secretary of Commerce to consider cost, quantity,
quality, durability, and reliability in obtaining the commodity
from other sources. 77 Three options are available if it is deter-
mined that the prohibited export is available from sources
outside the United States: the license requirement may be
dropped, the President may maintain the control notwithstand-
ing availability from non-U.S. sources, or the President may sub-
mit the matter to COCOM for multilateral review. 78 The Presi-
dent's power to retain the export restriction is contingent on the
President actively pursuing negotiations with the appropriate na-
tions to eliminate such availability.79 If negotiations are not suc-
cessful within six months, the commodity will no longer require
a validated license absent a presidential extension, up to twelve
months, which is granted based on progress in the negotiations
and the detriment to national security.80
73. Malloy, supra note 11, at 852.
74. Pub. L. No. 99-64, 99 Stat. 120 (1985) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app.
§§ 2401-2420 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
75. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403(c). This section states:
In accordance with the provisions of this Act, the President shall not impose
export controls for foreign policy or national security purposes on the export
from the United States of goods or technology with he determines are avail-
able without restriction from sources outside the United States in sufficient
quantities and comparable in quality to those produced in the United States
so as to render the controls ineffective in achieving their purposes, unless the
President determines that adequate evidence has been presented to him dem-
onstrating that the absence of such controls would prove detrimental to the
foreign policy or national security of the United States.
Id.
76. RL § 2404(f).
77. Id, § 2404(f) (3) (A).
78. I& § 2404(f)(3)(B).
79. Id. § 2404(f)(4)(A).
80. Id. § 2404(f) (4) (B).
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The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 198881
("OTCA") further liberalized export controls under the EAA.8 2
OTCA eliminated authorization requirements for exports to
COCOM countries and countries with export control practices
comparable to COCOM nations.8" OTCA also refined the pro-
cedure for determining if a controlled commodity was available
for sources outside the United States."4 Moreover, OTCA re-
stricted imposing export controls on a product solely because it
contains parts or components subject to control so long as the
part is essential to the function of the product, the part was in-
corporated in the product when it is sold, and the part com-
prises twenty-five percent or less of the product's value.""
C. Enforcement of Export Controls
U.S. enforcement mechanisms were effective in limiting
dual-use exports to Russia.8" Other COCOM nations, however,
failed to prevent critical technology from reaching the former
Soviet Union.87 Despite these deviations, multilateral export
controls, for the most part, impaired the Soviet Union's ability to
obtain advanced dual-use technologies.""8
81. Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app.
§§ 2401-2420 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
82. See Swan, supra note 58, at 624-25 (discussing how OTCA relaxed export con-
trols).
83. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(b) (2).
84. Pub. L No 100-418, § 2418, 102 Stat. 1107, 1352 (1988) (amending 50 U.S.C.
app. § 2404(f)).
85. Id. § 2422, 102 Stat. at 1358 (amending 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(m)). If the part
would make a significant contribution to the military potential of a controlled country,
a license could be required. Id.
86. See LoNc, supra note 5, at 2 (explaining how licensing requirements have pre-
vented goods and technology from reaching nations whose national security policies
are adverse to those of United States in addition to controlling exports of goods and
technology to allied nations).
87. See Oettinger, supra note 2, at 577-80 (highlighting events of the Toshiba-
Kongsberg affair where goods and technology shipped from Japan and Norway to So-
viet Union enabled Soviet Union to advance its nuclear submarine capabilities); see also
Christopher K. Davis, Eport Controls: New COCOM Measures on High-Technology Fports,
29 HARv. INT'L L.J. 547, 548 (1988) (commenting that United States received little sup-
port from Western European nations and Japan in controlling exportation of sensitive
technology to Soviet Union).
88. GARY K. BERTscH & SmvE ELuoTr-GowER, INMODUCTrON TO EXPORT CON.
TRois U4 TRmAsmON 1 (1992). In 1992, Western nations estimated to be ten years
ahead of the former Soviet Union in technological developments. Id.
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1. U.S. Enforcement Mechanisms
In the United States, once the BXA issues a license, the li-
censee is strictly accountable for the use."9 Every person in-
volved with the export transaction is responsible for effecting the
export and properly using the terms and conditions of the li-
cense."0 A licensee may not: (i) act with knowledge to deceive;
(ii) intend to export illegally; (iii) misrepresent facts; (iv) alter
or modify an export license or permit its unauthorized use; or,
(v) traffic or advertise the export control document.9 ' Any viola-
tion of the EEA or its regulations can trigger civil penalties.92 A
licensee who knowingly or willfully violates export regulations
may be subject to criminal punishment.93
2. Multilateral Enforcement
Unlike the Unites States, COCOM lacked the legal basis to
enforce controls.94 As COCOM was not established through a
formal treaty or agreement,9 even when COCOM members
agreed unanimously to a specific control, the control required
ratification by each nation to gain legal effect.9" In the process
of ratification, each nation was permitted to act in accordance
with its domestic policy.9 7
COCOM, however, did have some mechanisms of enforce-
ment. 8 Primarily, the Import Certificate/Delivery Verification
("IC/DV") attempted to ensure that exports between COCOM
89. 15 C.F.R. § 787.9 (1994).
90. 15 C.F.R. § 772.1(c).
91. OvEAVIEw OF EXPORT CoNTmoLs, supra note 26, at 68.
92. 15 C.F.R. § 787.1 (b) (3) (1991). Civil penalties up to US$10,000 may be admin-
istered for general violations. Id. Violations of national security controls is subject to
penalties of up to US$100,000. Id.
93. Id. § 787.1(a). A person who knowingly violates the EAA or any regulation is
subject to a fine up to five times the value of the exports involved or US$50,000 which
every is greater, or imprisonment up to five years or both. Id. § 787.1(a) (i). A person
who willfully violates any provision of the EAA is subject to fines five times the value of
the export up to US$1 million (US$250,000 for an individual), or up to ten years of
imprisonment, or both. I. § 787.1(a) (ii).
94. See Hunt, supra note 5, at 118 (stating that COCOM was structured so that each
member nation was responsible for enforcing export controls).
95. Id. at 112.
96. Id.
97. Dyslin, supra note 62, at 14.
98. See Hunt, supra note 5, at 116 (noting COCOM members attempted to prevent
diversions of technology through implementing Import Certification/Delivery Verifica-
tion system).
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nations were not diverted to controlled countries. 99 Under the
IC/DV system, an importer government was required to issue a
statement that the goods would not be diverted to another coun-
try without approval.10 0 After the export took place, the im-
porter government then released a delivery verification.101
COCOM members, nevertheless, failed to harmonize ex-
port controls among its member nations.10 2 Finding the U.S. re-
strictions over protective in relation to the threat of commu-
nism, 0 ' Japan and Western European countries permitted the
export of certain dual-use technologies to the Soviet Union
which were prohibited for export in the U.S.104 The competing
views between the United States and its COCOM allies caused
U.S. businesses to lose financial opportunities without prevent-
ing certain technology from reaching communist nations.10 5
3. The Toshiba-Kongsberg Incident and the U.S. Response
COCOM's weakness in controlling high-technology exports
to the Soviet Union was highlighted by the Toshiba-Kongsberg
incident.10 6 In 1982 to 1984 the Toshiba Machine Company of
Japan sold computerized milling machines to the Soviet
99. Id. at 116. In the United States, the IC/DV verification procedure was incorpo-
rated into the EAR. 15 C.F.R. § 775 (1994).
100. Id. § 775.3(a) (1).
101. Id. § 775.3(a) (2).
102. Oettinger, supra note 2, at 576. The lack of harmonization was due to the
diverging view betveen the United States and other COCOM nations regarding trade
with the Soviet Union and its allies. Davis, supra note 87, at 547-48. The United States
viewed export controls as a means of limiting economic development in Soviet Union
while Western European nations sought to establish an economically beneficial trade
relationship with the Soviet Union. Id.
103. Oettinger, supra note 2, at 576.
104. Id. at 576-77. Many COCOM members other than the United States found
restrictions on dual-use commodities unreasonable because the products had primarily
civilian applications. Id. Since the fall of communism in the Soviet Union, Japan and
European nations have exported dual-use technologies to the former Soviet Union
more frequently than the United States. Alam, supra note 10, at 145.
105. Oettinger, supra note 2, at 576-77. For example, in 1979, Cyril Bath, a U.S.
company, lost a contract to the Soviet Union because the United States complied with
COCOM standards while France deviated from COCOM standards and provided the
Soviet Union with the controlled commodity. See id. at 580 (describing Cyril Bath inci-
dent).
106. Davis, supra note 87, at 548-49. Following the Toshiba-Kongsberg incident,
COCOM members agreed to implement tougher penalties for violations of export con-
trols. Administration Officials Hail COCOM Parley as Success, Citing Progress in Enforcement,
5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 134-35 (Feb. 3, 1988).
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Union 107 while the Soviets obtained the numerical controller for
the machines from the Kongsberg Trading company of Nor-
way."' Both of these exports to the Soviet Union violated
COCOM regulations. 1 9 The combined purchase enabled the
Soviet Union to enhance the capabilities of its nuclear subma-
rines to evade radar.110 This COCOM violation cost the United
States billions of dollars to match the advances of the Soviets. 1
In response to the Toshiba-Kongsberg incident, the U.S.
Congress enacted the Multilateral Export Control Enhancement
Amendments Act of 1988112 ("MECEAA") as an addition to the
AA.113 Pursuant to the MECEAA, a person who violates a multi-
lateral export restriction, which results in the substantial en-
hancement1 4 of a controlled country's capabilities, is subject to
sanctions for a two to five year period. 11 5 Even if the violation
does not meet the substantial enhancement test, the President is
granted the discretion to impose sanctions for up to five years.'1 6
Another provision of MECEAA provides the United States with a
107. Clyde Haberman, Japan Fines Toshiba Unit for Sales to Soviet, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar.
23, 1998, at D14.
108. See Ralph Kinney Bennett, The Toshiba Scanda: Anatomy of a Betrayal, RE.AF's
DiG., Dec. 1987, at 95, 97 (discussing how Soviet Union obtained controllers from
Kongsberg).
109. Oettinger, supra note 2, at 578. Both Japan and the Toshiba Company were
largely responsible for this COCOM violation. Id. Toshiba misrepresented the capacity
of the milling machines to obtain the license from the Japan's Ministry of International
Trade and Industry ("MM"). Id. Due to the large volume of export applications, MITI
did not question the transaction. Id. Following this incident both Norway and Japan
established more stringent export control regulations. Id. at 579.
110. See Spencer L. Kenner & Mark A. Russell, The Toshiba Sanctions Provision: Its
Constitutionality and Impact on COCOM, 1989 B.Y.U. L. lRv. 623, 623-24 & n.6 (1989)
(explaining how both products used together create quiet submarine propellers, which
allowed Soviet Union to build submarines that can move undetected).
111. See 134 CONG. REc. S14,927 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1988) (statement of Sen.
Heinz) (stating Toshiba diversion will cost United States between US$8 and 100 billion
to repair loss in military advantage over Soviet Union).
112. Pub L. No. 100-418, §§ 2441-2447, 102 Stat. 1107, 1364-70 (1988) (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410a (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
113. Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app.
§§ 2401-2420). The Multilateral Export Control Enhancement Amendments Act was
part of the Omnibus Trade Competitiveness Act. Id,; see supra notes 81-85 and accom-
panying text (discussing OTCA amendments to EAA).
114. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410a(a) (2). A substantial enhancement is determined by
the President, on the advice of the National Security Council. Id.
115. Id. § 2410a(a). The sanctions bar the violating company from selling to any
U.S. federal agency and prohibit importing into the United States., I § 2410a(b).
116. Id. § 2410a(h).
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civil remedy for damages for the cost of enhancing the U.S. mili-
tary to match the advances of nations threatening U.S. security
interests.117
D. The Commerce Control List of 1991
In 1990, responding to the fall of communism in Eastern
Europe,1 ' COCOM nations relaxed export controls of dual-use
commodities such as computers and telecommunication equip-
ment to the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries. 11 9 In
1991, COCOM members enacted a new Industrial List ("Core
List") enumerating the commodities, software and technical
data that remained subject to export controls.1 20 The United
States adopted the Core List in the form of amendments to the
EAR and the CCL.12 1
The new list instituted various changes. 122 In contrast to
earlier controls, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia were
granted favorable consideration for all controlled exports. 2 3
COCOM members concluded that the development of demo-
cratic political systems and market economies in these countries,
in addition to the severance of military ties with the Soviet
Union, diminished the need to deny them access to Western
technology.1 24 Under the new CCL, however, export controls to
the former Soviet Union on high technology equipment re-
117. Id. § 2410a(i)(k).
118. See Robert G. Kaiser, The Miracle of 1989, WASH. PoST, Dec. 24, 1989, at Col
(commenting on fall of communism in all Eastern European nations and Baltic States).
119. McKenzie, supra note 3, at 2. These relaxation of export controls were then
implemented in the United States. 15 C.F.R. §§ 776, 778, 779, 799 (1994). These
changes relaxed export controls on computers above the level of personal computers
and mass-marketed software. John F. McKenzie, Relaxation of U.S. Controls on Computer
and Software Exports, ComrtrrmR Lw., Sept. 1990, at 17, 18.
120. Id. at 2-3.
121. 15 C.F.R. § 799.1 (Supp. 1); see McKenzie, supra note 3, at 2-3 (stating United
States adopted COCOM's new Core List).
122. McKenzie, supra note 3. The Industrial List was restructured, dividing con-
trolled dual-use commodities into ten categories and then subdividing them into five
separate product groups. Id at 4-5. In addition, a new measure of computer perform-
ance was introduced. Id. at 8.
123. Id. at 7.
124. Id. Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary were granted these deregulations
because these countries were deemed to have made the most progress toward establish-
ing capitalist, democratic governments. Id
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mained. 125
II. THE IMPLEMENTATION AND PENDING LEGISLATION TO
DECONTROL DUAL-USE EXPORTS TO RUSSIA
Following the fall of the Soviet Union in December 1991,
the United States continued to impose controls on exports to
Russia.12 6  In April 1994, coinciding with the disbanding of
COCOM, President Clinton eliminated the validated license re-
quirement for most telecommunication and certain computer
exports to Russia. 127 In order to implement further deregula-
tion, members of the U.S. Congress seek to amend the EAA to
prohibit controls on computer and telecommunication exports
to Russia.12 1 Support for this legislation rests on the economic
opportunities in Russia and the reduced threat Russia poses to
U.S. security interests.129 Critics of this legislation, however, ar-
gue that decontrolling dual-use exports invite threats to national
security. 30
A. The Current Political and Economic Situation in Russia
Central to the debate over deregulating exports is the cur-
rent political and economic situation in Russia."' Russia has ex-
hibited positive signs toward the development of capitalism and
democracy, 32 but there are growing anti-democratic factions in
125. See Dual Pesonality, supra note 19, at 114 (stating new core list failed to liber-
alize controls on high-technology export to Russia).
126. See Christopher A. Padilla, Teecommunications Export Controls: Last Vestige of the
Cold War, in CoPmNG Wrr EXPORT CoNTmoLs 1993, at 285, 287-90 (PLI Comm. L. &
Practice Course Handbook Series No. 675, 1993) [hereinafter Cold War Controls] (stat-
ing that United States and other COCOM nations still maintained most of Cold War
export controls to Russia).
127. See U.S. Lifts Curbs, supra note 12, at 530 (reporting on disbanding COCOM
on March 31, 1994 and elimination of certain dual-use U.S. export restrictions to Rus-
sia).
128. See supra note 14 (listing bills seeking to amend the EAA to decontrol export
restrictions on dual-use technology to Russia and other nations).
129. See Alam, supra note 10, at 143 (advocating that demise of Russian threat
should yield increase in technological trade between United States and Russia).
130. Morillo, supra note 16, at 1120. President Clinton has been criticized for em-
phasizing increasing exports to create jobs at the expense of national security, especially
with regard to the relaxation of dual-use exports such as computers and telecommuni-
cations. Id.
131. See Alam, supra note 10, at 143 (stating that rationale for controlling exports
to Russia should be revised in light of political and economic developments in Russia).
132. See Adi Ignatius, The Russian MarketTakes on New Luster, WALt ST. J., July 11,
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the Russian Parliament. 13 3 In addition, the Russian government
continue to experience economic instability 4 and wide-spread
corruption. ls5
1. Encouraging Developments in Post-Soviet Russia
The new Russian government has made significant steps to-
ward establishing a democracy. 3 6 Elections, held on December
12, 1993, created a Russian Parliament,8 " establishing a genuine
political system in Russia for the first time in one hundred
years. 1 3  In order to further the transition to a democratic gov-
ernment, members of the Russian Parliament are participating
in a cooperation program with their counterparts in the U.S.
Congress to learn more about the democratic process. 3 9
The transition from a communist to a capitalist economy is
also progressing. 40  In 1991, the Russian government estab-
lished a legal basis for private businesses in Russia.14  Since
then, the Russian government has implemented legislation that
encourages the development of private business.142 As of Janu-.
1994, at Al (reporting on progress in stabilizing Russian economy and decision of Rus-
sian President Boris Yeltsin to continue economic reforms).
133. See Policy Toward MS, supra note 17, at 1 (statement of Hon, Lee H. Hamil-
ton) (noting that Ultra-Nationalist Party is largest party bloc in Russia).
134. See Dimitri K. Simes, The Cold Peace, WASH. POST, July 17, 1994, at CO5 (re-
porting Russia continues to face declining production and rising trade deficit).
135. See COMMISSION ON SEcuRrry AND CooPEmRTON IN EUROPE, IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE Hmimuu AccoRDS: CRIME AND CoRRumIoN N RUSSIA (1994) [hereinafter CreM
AND CORRUPnON IN RUSSIA] (describing how organized crime has penetrated Russian
economy and political arena).
136. See Carla Ann Robbins & Barbara Rosewicz, Reaching Out: U.S. hopes to Move
Moscow Into the West Through Deeper Ties But Courting Russia's Elites In Military and Industry
Entail Signilcant Risks, WALL ST.J., Dec. 13, 1993, at Al (reporting that in December,
1993 Russia approved a new constitution and held elections for first time since fall of
Soviet Union).
137. Policy Toward MS, supra note 17, at 43 (statement of Hon. Strobe Talbott,
Ambassador-at-Large and Special Advisor to the Secretary of State for the New In-
dependent States).
138. Id. at 49 (prepared statement of Hon. Strobe Talbott).
139. Id.:
140. See Russian Economic Development: Heating Before the Subcomm. on International
Development, Finance, Trade, and Monetary Policy of the House Comm on Banking, Finance
and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1993) (statement of Dmitri Bednyakov,
Mayor, Nizhny Novgorod) (describing laws implemented to help further economic re-
form in Russia).
141. Id. at 3.
142. Id. at 3-4. In December 1992, it became possible to register a business enter-
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ary 1994, forty percent of the Russian economy was privatized, 1' 4
and one-forth of the labor force was employed in the private sec-
tor.
14
In addition, the Russian economy is beginning to stabi-
lize.14 Price controls were freed on more than ninety percent of
goods and services, 1 thereby decreasing shortages and stabiliz-
ing the ruble.147  Inflation has also dropped significantly.148
Moreover, the increasing number of U.S. companies willing to
pursue business ventures in Russia exhibits Russia's positive in-
vestment climate. 149
Russia has also pursued external policies that comply with
U.S. interests.150 Pursuant to a request by the U.S. government,
the Russian government rescinded a sale of ballistic missile rock-
ets to India.' The Russian government is also Working with
President Clinton to establish the Partnership for Peace, a post-
cold war security structure in Europe.15 2
2. Political and Economic Concerns in Today's Russia
Despite the positive steps toward democracy and capitalism,
political and economic instability persists in Russia today.'" In
addition to the constant opposition from ultra-nationalists and
prise in a Russian post office. Id. at 3. Furthermore, there are no local taxes on busi-
ness. Id. at 4.
143. Policy Toward NIS, supra note 17, at 25 (testimony of Hon. Strobe Talbott,
Ambassador-at-Large). In order to further privatization, several Russian businessmen
have visited the United States to receive training and education. Id.
144. Id at 50 (prepared statement of Hon. Strobe Talbott).
145. See Ignatius, supra note 132 (noting that inflation is down and non-Russian
investment in Russia is increasing).
146. Policy Toward NIS, supra note 17, at 50 (prepared statement of Hon. Strobe
Talbott).
147. Abram Bergson, Russia'sFxonomic Reform Mudd, CHAU.ENGE, Sept.-Oct. 1994,
at 56.
148. Ignatius, supra note 132. Tight monetary policies reduced the annual rate of
inflation in Russia by 700%. 1&
149. Id.
150. See Policy Toward NIS, supra note 17, at 55-58 (prepared statement of Hon.
Strobe Talbott) (noting.encouraging developments in Russian external policy). One
encouraging development is the agreement between the United States, Russia, and
Ukraine to remove all nuclear weapons from the Ukraine. Id. at 56-57.
151. Id. at 34.
152. Id. at 6.
153. See id. at 1 (statement of Hon. Lee Hamilton [D-Ind.], Chairman of House
Comm. on Foreign Affiirs) (commenting that Ultra-Nationalist Party is largest party
bloc in Russia and Russian economy has suffered serious setbacks).
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defiant communists, 5 4 fewer and fewer Russian democrats are
offering Yeltsin their support.155 Yeltsin's policies have caused
many Russians to be fearful of democracy and a free-market
economy. 5 ' Since Yeltsin declared war on the Republic of
Chechnya,'5 7 his approval rating has decreased to eight per-
cent. 58 Due to the war with Chechnya, Yeltsin also lost the sup-
port of two key Russian democratic leaders.159
Many Russians view Yeltsin as an authoritarian leader who
has preserved the Soviet ruling class.160  Because many Yeltsin
appointees are also fearful of losing power, division within his
inner-circle has grown over how to handle his unpopularity.1 6 1
One faction is pushing for early elections in the hope that the
opposition will, not find support behind one leader, while the
other faction suggests Yeltsin should reject implementing a dem-
ocratic government and become an authoritarian leader. 62 Af-
ter refusing to hold elections in 1994, Yeltsin is looking for ways
to postpone the elections scheduled for 1996.163
The extent of the political instability is highlighted by the
popularity of ultra-nationalist Vladimir V. Zhirinovsky. 164 In the
154. Cohen, supra note 17. Ultra-nationalists see Yeltsin as a puppet of the United
States who plotted the breakup of Soviet Union. Id.
155. Id. Since the Russian armed response in the succesionary republic of
Chechnya, Yeltsin's support from liberals has dwindled. Fred Hiatt, Yetsin Faces a Risky
Road to Recoveiy, WASH. PosT, Jan. 22, 1995, at A20.
156. Id.
157. See Claudia Rosett, Cold Winter. Fighting In Chechnya Is Isolating Yeltsin, Jeopard-
izing Reform, But a Coup in Russia Appears Less Likely Than Chaos, The Military Grumbles,
Wm.L ST.J.,Jan. 1, 1995, at Al (reporting on Russian war with Chechnya, which began
in December 1994 and has cost thousands of lives on both sides). Chechnya, a Muslim
republic 900 miles from Moscow, declared its independence from Russia in 1991. Jan
Cienski, Russia's Renegade Republic, U.S. NEws & WomL) REm., Sept. 12, 1994, at 26. In
July 1994, after repeated kidnappings by Chechen terrorists, Russia attempted to re-
move the leader of Chechnya, setting the stage for a civil war. Id.
158. Hiatt, supra note 155, at A20. Even prior to the war in Chechnya, Yeltsin was
only preferred by 14-20% of those Russians surveyed. Cohen, supra note 17, at 373.
159. Lee Hockstader, RE-Allies See Yeltsin Jumping Demoracy's Foundership, WASH.
Post, Jan. 1, 1995, at A28. Former acting prime minister, Yegor Gaidar, and former
finance minister, Boris Fyodorov, both key official in furthering economic reform,
ceased to support Yeltsin following his decision to send troops to Chechnya. Id.
160. Cohen, supra note 17, at 373.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. Yeltsin's ally, Vladimir Shumeiko, chair of the Russian parliament's upper
chambers, suggests the tenure of both the legislature and the president should extend
until 1998. Simes, supra note 134, at CO5.
164. Policy Toward MS, supra note 17, at 1 (statement of Hon. Lee Hamilton).
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December 1993 elections, Zhirinovsky's Ultra-Nationalist Party
emerged as the largest bloc in the Russian government. 8 ' Zhiri-
novsky's agenda includes eliminating Western investment in Rus-
sia and rebuilding Russia's defense industry.166
In addition, remnants of the communist regime remain in
Russia.'"" Although the KGB18 was dismantled following the
failed coup against former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in
1991, Russia's new Ministry of Security is run by many of the
same people who headed the KGB.169 Like the KGB, the Minis-
try of Security intends to perform counter-surveillance activi-
ties.'"" Moreover, former KGB officers are involved in building
the Russian economy. 7' Through their ties to the Russian econ-
omy, ex-KGB agents pursuing commercial ventures can travel
freely in Western countries. 17 2
Continuing economic instabilities also open doors for ultra-
nationalists and extremists to gain control.178 Industrial produc-
tion continues to decline, nearly twenty-six percent in 1994,174
and although there are more products in the stores, most are
produced outside Russia.'7 5 According to Central Bank Director
Victor Geraschenko, Russia's enormous trade deficit is the real
165. Id.
166. Peter Galuska, A Rabid Nationalist Spoils Yelsin's Day, Bus. W., Dec. 27, 1993,
at 56.
167. SeeJeffery Trimble, New Act, Old Tricks: Dismantled After the Failed Soviet Coup,
the KGB is Flourishing in Boris Yeltsin's Russia, U.S. NEws & WoRm REP., Feb. 8, 1993, at
42 (reporting on KGB influence remaining in Russia).
168. See GORDON B. SMITH, Sovrir PoLrrcs CoNm-aurny Am CoNTRAmlanON 163
(1988). The KGB was one of the three "uniformed services" in the Soviet political sys-
tem responsible for weapons and intelligence gathering technology, and controlling
information that was vital to the Soviet government. Id. The KGB performed domestic
and international intelligence activities. Id. at 170-71. There were several hundred
thousand KGB employees working as guards, informants, officer workers, and border
troops. IM at 171.
169. Trimble, supra note 167, at 42.
170. Id. In the 1993 December Congress, People's Deputies Security Minister




173. See Policy Toward NIS, supra note 17, at 54 (prepared statement of Hon. Strobe
Talbott) (urging U.S. government to continue to aid in developing Russia's economy
because economic stability is necessary to produce political stability and counter anti-
democratic political movements).
174. Simes, supra note 134, at C05.
175. Id.
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threat to the Russian economy. 1 6 In 1993, foreign investment in
Russia totalled less than US$1.5 billion, while Russian capital
abroad totalled US$10 to US$15 billion.17 7
Further instabilities exist because the Russian economy is in-
creasingly influenced by organized crime.178 Corruption devel-
oped in Russia as a result of the economic crisis that followed the
fall of the Soviet Union.179 Seventy percent of Russian busi-
nesses are connected in some way to organized crime.'80 Cor-
rupt activities have created a society where street gangs, extor-
tion, private armies, and armed guards are prevalent.'8 ' In addi-
tion, major U.S. companies are hesitant to invest in Russia as
organized crime threatens the security of U.S. capital and per-
sonnel.18 2
Organized crime has also penetrated Russian politics by fi-
nancing elections and undermining the electoral process. 8 3
Corrupt officials have slowed the adoption of anti-corruption
and banking laws.' 84 The rise in criminal activities has also led
some of the Russian people to favor an authoritarian form of
government as Russia was virtually crime free before the attempt
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. CR.M AND CORRUPTION m RusstA, supr note 135, at 4. (statement of Dr. Lou-
ise Shelley of American University Department ofJustice, Law, and Society).
179. Michael A. Leeden, With Today's Outlook Aid Won't Help Russia, INSIGHT ON
TrE NEws, Sept. 26, 1994, at 20. The political upheaval eliminated the Russian banks'
abilities to conduct international business, as they could not make hard-currency trans-
fers in a timely fashion because the ruble was not freely convertible. Id. This caused
the Russian economy to become a primitive cash system in which the Ruble became the
currency for launderers in exchange for Russians gaining a more stable currency. Id.
Later criminals from Western countries began purchasing raw materials in large
volumes in exchange for hard currency. Id.
180. CRIME AND CORRUPTION IN RussiA, supra note 135, at 12 (statement of Ste-
phen Handelman, Associate Fellow at the Harriman Center of Columbia University).
Small bankers and retailers cannot operate without being connected to the Mafia.
Simes, supra note 134, at C05. Due to the volume of criminal activity, the figures indi-
cating the rise in privatization in Russia are not reflective of a genuine restructuring.
Id. In many cases, Russians who have received privatization rights have been forced to
surrender their property rights to organized crime gangs. CRIME AND CORRUPTION IN
RussrA, supra note 135, at 6 (statement of Dr. Louise Shelly).
181. Leeden, supra note 179, at 20.
182. CRIME AND CORRUPTION IN Russm, supra note 135, at 4 (statement of Dr. Lou-
ise Shelly).
183. Id. at 3. In 1993 more than 1500 Russian government officials were charged
with serious corruption and another 4500 cases were brought to trial. Id. at 11 (state-
ment of Stephen Handelman).
184. Id. at 3 (statement of Dr. Louise Shelly).
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to transform to a democratic political system began. 85
Yeltsin has also asserted a nationalistic external policy that is
at odds with U.S. interests.'8 In early 1994, Russia declared its
opposition to Eastern European countries joining NATO. 8'7
Furthermore, Yeltsin has stressed the desire to have Russian de-
fense contractors market their products abroad,18 to control
peacekeeping in the former Soviet territories, 89 and to defend
ethnic Russians living in former Soviet republics such as the Bal-
tic States and Kazakhstan.' Russian Foreign Minister, Andrei
Kozyrev, stated that the assertive Russian foreign policy is merely
rhetoric to satisfy the increasingly nationalist opinion.'9 ' At the
same time, the Kremlin has expressed to the Russian people that
the West, while not an enemy, is not a friend either. 9 2
B. U.S. Decontrol Initiatives Since the Fall of COCOM
Despite the current political and economic instabilities in
Russia,'19 export deregulations were implemented by the Com-
merce Department through the issuance of unrestricted licenses
for exports to the former Soviet Union.194 Pursuant to the EAA,
the Executive Branch has the power to administer these regula-
tory changes without amending the EAA or subjecting control
modifications for congressional review.'95 In conjunction with
185. Id. at 5-6.
186. See Sonni Efron, Yeltsin Shows Hard Edge on Foreign Policy, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 25,




190. Id. According to Alexei Pushkov, deputy editor of the Moscow News, Russia
"represents not just a regional... but a truly Eurasian superpower with considerable
opportunities to influence the situation in nearby regions, including the Balkans, the
Middle East, and the Korean peninsula." Simes, supra note 184, at C05.
191. I.
192. Id.
193. See supra notes 153-92 and accompanying text (enumerating barriers limiting
development of capitalism and democracy in Russia).
194. 15 C.F.R. § 771.20 (1994). This provision established the "GLX," a license
that permits the exportation of previously proscribed commodities to Russia without
prior approval by the BXA. Id. This license is also available for exports to Eastern
European countries and China. Id.
195. See LONG, supra note 5, at 10-11 (discussing how Congress, pursuant to the
EAA, left implementation of export controls to President and Department of Com-
merce); see also 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (delegating responsi-
bility of maintaining control lists to Secretary of Commerce).
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the reduction of export controls, the Clinton Administration has
pursued an agenda that seeks to establish an entirely new export
policy toward Russia. 196
1. Regulatory Changes in Export Controls
In April of 1994, the Department of Commerce issued a
new general license 197 ("GLX"), which enables U.S. exporters to
ship previously restricted telecommunications equipment to
Russia without the need for prior approval by the U.S. govern-
ment.198 The GLX encompasses commodities currently listed in
the advisory notes of the CCL that indicate a likelihood of ap-
proval for export to the former Soviet Republics.' 99 The GLX,
however, is not available for items subject to missile technology,
nuclear proliferation, or foreign policy controls and only encom-
passes exports to civil end users"' for civilian uses.2 '
The GLX also enables U.S. companies to export high-speed
digital computers to Russia with a composite theoretical per-
formance 20 2 ("CTP") of up to 1000 million theoretical opera-
196. See Morillo, supra note 16, at 1113 (discussing September 1993, Trade Promo-
tion Committee Report, which revealed President Clinton's new export strategy, which
included eliminating export controls to revive national economy). In addition, the Dep-
uty Assistant Secretary of State for Export Controls said the United States would like
Russia to become a founding member of the new multilateral export regime. Export
Controls: U.S., Allies, Set to Launch New Regime, but Russian Membership Still Uncertain, 11
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 42, at 1634 (Oct. 26, 1994) [hereinafter Launching New
Regime]. Furthermore, the United States signed a memorandum of understanding with
Russia to work toward establishing a global information system. High Technology: U.S.
Signs Understanding with Russia on Global Information Infrastructure, 11 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) No. 32, at 1249 (Aug. 10, 1994) [hereinafter Gl Memorandum].
197. 15 C.F.R. § 771.20 (1994).
198. AT&T Big Winner as White House Lifts Telecom Fxport Bans, REP. ON AT&T, Apr.
11, 1994, available in Westlaw, Allnews Database. The GLX is a blanket license that
enables all but the most sophisticated telecom hardware to be exported to Russia. Id.
199. 15 C.F.R. § 771.20(b). Telecommunications equipment and technology likely
to be approved in the advisory notes of the CCL include optical fiber communication
cables, optical fiber test equipment, digital radio equipment, and telecommunications
software. Id. § 799.1 (Supp. 1).
200. See H.R. 3937, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 116, at 227 (1994) (defining end user as
person located outside United States who is true party in interest in actually receiving
export for intended use of item as represented by export license applicant).
201. 15 C.F.R. § 771.20(c).
202. See id. § 799.1 (Supp. 3). The composite theoretical performance of a com-
puter measures the speed at which a computer performs computational operations in
terms of million of theoretical operations per second. Id.
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tions per second ("MTOPS"). 2 °5 Previously, computers with a
CTP greater than sixty-seven MTOPS were restricted for export
to Russia. 20 4 In addition, the definition of a supercomputer was
amended.0 5 Supercomputers require a validated license for
shipment to any destination.20 6 Formerly, a supercomputer was
any computer with a CTP of 195 or more MTOPS,207 but the
term was amended to include only computers with 1500 or more
MTOPS.208
2. Recent U.S. Policies Toward Russia
In addition to licensing deregulations, the United States has
exhibited a willingness to include Russia as a member of the new
multilateral control regime to replace COCOM.20 9 Prior to the
dissolution of COCOM, the member nations agreed to form a
new multilateral export control regime.210 As COCOM's succes-
sor has yet to form,2 11 negotiations over control lists and target-
ing particular countries continue,2 1 2 but the greatest obstacle in-
203. TRADE PROMOTION COORDINATING ComOM-ra, NATIONAL EXPORT STRATEGY,
ANNUAL REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS 30-31 (1994) [hereinafter TPCC REPORT].
204. Commerce Publishes Regulations Implemented Further Computer Decontrols, U.S.
DEPr. OF COMmERCE NEWS, Feb. 24, 1994, at 1 (hereinafter Commerce Report]. Earlier in
1994, computers with a CIP of up to 260 MTOPS were eligible for a general license for
export to Russia. I&
205. Id.
206. 15 C.F.R. § 776.11.
207. Commerce Report, supra note 204.
208. 15 C.F.R. § 776.11(a).
209. Launching New Regime, supra note 196, at 1634. Martha C. Harris, Deputy As-
sistant Secretary of State for Export Controls, seeks to include Russia as a founding
member of the new multilateral export control regime. Id.
210. Export Controls: US., Allies Still at Odds Overs Substance of New Post-COCOM Re-
gime, Official Says, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 175-76 (Feb. 2, 1994). Like
COCOM, the new regime will prevent the proliferation of sensitive dual-use technology
but the new regime will not focus on a static set of enemies. Id. at 176. The new regime
will be called the New Multilateral Export Control Arrangement. Export Controls: U.S.,
Allies Fail to Agree on Bringing Russia Into New Export Control Regime, 12 Int'l Trade Daily
(BNA) No. 1, at 5 (Jan. 4, 1995) [hereinafter Russia in New Regime]. Countries such as
Poland, Romania, and Czech Republic are expected to join the new regime. Id. at 6.
211. See id (indicating negotiations among countries establishing new export con-
trol regime will continue in 1995 and that no deadline for forming organization has
been set).
212. Export Controls: US. Allies Firm Up List of Exports To Be Curbed Under Post-
COCOMRegime, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 49, at 1922 (Dec. 14, 1994) [hereinafter
Allies Firm Up List]. The United States and its allies have tentatively agreed on a list of
commodities that will be controlled under the new regime. Id. Allies are also close to
an agreement on how to prohibit exports to 'pariah' countries. Id. at 1922-23.
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volves Russian membership in the new regime.21 5 While the
United States would like to have Russia to join the regime, U.S.
President Clinton has indicated Russian membership is contin-
gent on Russia rescinding a weapon sales contract with Iran dat-
ing back to 1988.214
A further indication of change in the U.S.-Russia export re-
lationship was exhibited in July 1994, when the United States
and Russia signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the De-
velopment of the Global Information Infrastructure2 1 5 ("GII")
and also agreed on a work plan for future cooperation on tele-
communication policy and technical assistance. 216  The objec-
tive of the GII is to integrate local, national, and regional net-
works to facilitate a global sharing of information, creating a
global information marketplace. 1 The GII memorandum ex-
presses the intentions of the United States and Russia to achieve
a global information infrastructure through the mutual ex-
change of information on objectives. 21  Deregulating export
controls on information technology is necessary to bring the GII
to fruition.21 9
In addition, the policy of the United States since 1992 has
been to encourage U.S. trade and investment in Russia through
213. Russia in New Regime, supra note 210, at 5.
214. LaunchingNew Regime, supra note 196, at 1634. The United States and Russia,
however, are working toward an agreement on this issue. See Russia in New Regime, supra
note 210, at 5. Russia agreed to forego future arms sales to Iran, but the United States
is concerned about the 1988 contract between Iran and Russia, which is still in effect.
I&
215. MEMORANDUM OF UNDEnsrANDING BErWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERCA
AND THE RUssIAN FEDERATION ON TmE GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRuCrURE INIATIvE
(1994).
216. Gl Memorandum, supra note 196, at 1249. The GIl was first outlined by U.S.
Vice-President Al Gore in March 1994 at the World Telecommunications Development
Conference in Buenos Aires. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id The Memorandum also acknowledges the principles of the GH: private
investment, competition, open access to the network, appropriate regulation, and uni-
versal service. Id.
219. See Broadcasting & Telecommunications Russia and USA Sign Memorandum on In-
formation Resources, Russi EXPREss-PERESTOA, Sept. 12, 1994, available in Westlaw,
Allnews Database (stating that dissolution of COCOM and removal of export controls
were necessary to provide Russia with necessary equipment and databases to further
U.S.-Russia agreement). All these exports are necessary to develop Russia's information
highway, as Russia is currently relying on 1950's technology. Cold War Contms, supra
note 126, at 290.
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the U.S.-Russia Business Development Committee.220 U.S. agen-
cies such as the Overseas Private Investment Corporation 221
("OPIC") help U.S. firms develop business in Russia.222 In 1994,
OPIC issued US$10 million in political risk insurance to enable
U.S. West, a U.S. telecommunications firm, to invest in upgrad-
ing telephone services in Russia.223
C. Pending Legislation
Members of the U.S. Congress have also sought to revise
U.S. export laws toward Russia.224 Several bills introduced in the
House of Representatives225 and the Senate 226 seek to amend the
EAA to deregulate export controls on dual-use equipment and
technology beyond what the Clinton Administration has already
instituted.227  This legislation has received much attention as
President Clinton and the U.S. Congress are committed to
amending the Export Administration Act in 1995.228
1. Telecommunication and Computer Export Control
Amendments
In August of 1993, Representative Ron Wyden [D-OR] in-
troduced House Bill 2912229 to amend the control list provision
220. TPCC REPORT, supra note 203, at 80-81. The Business Development Commit-
tee interacts with more than twenty U.S. government agencies, in addition to the busi-
ness community, to establish programs and activities to increase trade with Russia. Id
221. INn TRAToNAL TRADE, supra note 6, at 252. The Overseas Private Investment
Corporation ("OPIC") is a quasi-independent U.S. government corporation that sup-
ports international economic undertakings. Id. OPIC primarily insures U.S. invest-
ments in developing countries. Id.
222. TPCC REPORT, supra note 203, at 81.
223. Id. U.S. West also constructed a cellular communications network in St. Pe-
tersburg that is expected to generate exports. Id.
224. See supra note 14 (listing legislation in Congress seeking to revise EAA to der-
egulate controls on dual-use technology to Russia and other nations).
225. H.R. 2912, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 3431, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993); H.R. 3627, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 3534, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993); H.R. 3937, 103d Cong. 2d Sess. (1994).
226. S. 1617, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); S. 1820, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); S.
1838, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
227. See, e.g., H.R. 3431, 1Od Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (seeking to eliminate con-
trols on computer equipment to virtually all to Russia and all other countries not sub-
ject to U.S. embargo).
228. Export Controls: Roth Says President is Committed to Working With Congress on EAA
Bill, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 228 (Feb. 1, 1995).
229. H.R. 2912, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). This bill is entitled "a bill to liberalize
controls on the export of telecommunications equipment and technology in order to
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in the EAA230 to further deregulate exports of telecommunica-
tions equipment and technology2 8 ' to Russia, China, and Eastern
Europe. 32 Representative Wyden's bill was subsequently intro-
duced in the U.S. Senate in 1994.233 House Bill 2912 would
amend the EAA to require the Secretary of Commerce to pro-
pose to the multilateral export control regime the elimination of
controls on telecommunication exports for civil end uses to Rus-
promote democracy and free communication and enhance economic competitiveness."
I& at 1. There is a 13% chance this bill will pass the House Committee on Foreign
Affhirs. BILcsA (103d Cong. 1993-94), available in Westlaw, BC Database.
230. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(c) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). This section requires the
Secretary of Commerce to maintain a control list of commodities subject to export con-
trols for national security purposes. Id.
231. H.R. 2912 § 2, at 3-5.
(i) the term 'telecommunications equipment' includes-
(I) telephone switching systems and stored program controlled
communications switching systems, including related features and com-
ponents that provide services and management of telecommunications
networks;
(II) telecommunications transmission equipment;
(III) microwave, light wave, and other radio relay, transmitting, or
test equipment, and related components and accessories;
(V) telecommunications cables and components, including opti-
cal fibers and optical fiber cables;
(V) equipment containing frequency synthesizers when used in
land-based mobile communications systems;
(VI) equipment described in any of subclauses (I) through (V), or
any other telecommunications equipment, that contains lasers;
(VII) computer hardware and application specific software which
are related to any of the items described in clauses (I) through (VI) and
are required for data communications; and
(VIII) all spare parts, components, and measuring or test equipment
related to any of the items described in subclauses (I) through (VII);
(ii) the term 'telecommunications technology' means technology related
to telecommunications equipment, including technology for the production,
development, and use of telecommunications equipment;
(iii) the term 'telecommunications networks' includes local area, in-
tracity, intercity, and international telecommunications networks; and
(iv) the term 'telecommunications' means voice, video, and data commu-
nications over any public or private network or broadcasting system, and ser-
vice related to such communications.
Id.
232. Id. at 3. The Eastern European countries included in this bill are Poland, the
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia.
I&
233. S. 1838, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). S. 1838 has a 21% chance of passing in
the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. Bnr.CAn (103d Cong.
1993-94), available in Wesaw, BC Database.
986 FORDHAMINTERivATIONALLAWJOURIVAL [Vol. 18:959
sia and the other nations included under this Bill.234
In addition, two proposals are pending in both the House
and Senate to amend Section 4 of the EAA235 to deregulate ex-
ports of computer equipment and technology.2 6 Although this
legislation does not mention Russia specifically, these amend-
ments to the EAA would ultimately deregulate much of the
equipment currently prohibited for export to Russia.23 7 House
Bill 3534,238 proposed in the Senate as Senate Bill 1820,29 would
require the Secretary of Commerce to conduct yearly reviews
240
of export controls of computer equipment and technology2 41 for
each country for which a validated license is required. 21 House
Bill 3534 would also require the Secretary of Commerce to re-
port to Congress indicating the reasons for each control.243 If
the purpose of control is to defer the development of a specific
capability in a particular country, the Secretary of Commerce
234. H.R. 2912 § 2, at 2-3. The bill also eliminates the requirement of re-export
authorization for re-exports to the former Soviet Republics, China, and certain Eastern
European nations. Id.
235. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403. Section 4 is the General Provisions section of the EAA
that discusses types of licenses, delegation of authority, notification to the public, and
fees. Id.
236. See H.R. 3534, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); S. 1820, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1994); H.R. 3431, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); S. 1617, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993)
(seeking to deregulate export controls on computer equipment and technology).
237. See H.R. 3534, H.R. 3431 (seeking to deregulate exports to countries where
validated license is required for computer exports). A validated license is required to
export most computer equipment and technology to Russia. 15 C.F.R. § 799.1 (Supp. 1
1994).
238. H.R. 3534, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). The short title of this bill is the
"Computer Equipment and Technology Export Control Reform Act." Id. at 1. There is
a 35% chance this bill will pass the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Bn-LcAsr
(103d Cong. 1993-94), available in Westlaw, BC Database.
239. S. 1820, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). This bill has only an eight percent
chance of passing through the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs. BU.LcAsT (103d Cong. 1993-94), availabl in Westlaw, BC Database.
240. H.R. 3534 § 2, at 2-4. In reviewing the existing controls the Secretary must
consider: (1) the compatibility with U.S. policy objectives toward the target country;, (2)
the quantity and performance of the computer systems; (3) the availability of the con-
trolled export from other sources; and (4) the economic costs of the controlled export.
Id.
241. Id. at 2. Computer equipment and technology includes computer hardware,
software, computer communications equipment, networking equipment, and related
technology. Id.
242. Id, at 2-7. After the review is completed, House Bill 3534 would require the
Secretary of Commerce to increase the export controls thresholds if warranted by the
findings in the review. I& at 4-5.
243. Id. at 2-3.
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must indicate the period of time the controls are expected to
defer such capability.2 " In an attempt to balance the need for
revising export controls with national security concerns, House
Bill 3534 would require the Secretary of Commerce to identify
and publish proliferation end users24 and the specific validated
license requirement for that end user.246
House Bill 3431, proposed by Representative Donald
Manzullo [R-IL], would implement even broader deregulation
of computer equipment and technology exports than House Bill
3534.247 By adding a provision to Section 4 of the EAA, House
Bill 3431 seeks to eliminate the requirement of a validated li-
cense for the export of computers, telecommunications equip-
ment, and certain semiconductors except to: (i) a terrorist coun-
try; (ii) a country subject to an embargo by the United Nations
which the U.S. is participating in; or (ii) any product to which
missile technology controls apply.2 48 Because Russia is neither
244. Id. House Bill 3534 would also remove controls on computer systems valued
at less than US$5,000. Id. § 3, at 7. In additon, House Bill 3534 seeks to decontrol
exports of mass-market computer equipment. Id. § 4, at 8.
For purposes of this subsection, the term 'mass-market computer equipment'
means any computer system, computer networking equipment, peripheral to a
computer system, part or subassembly of a computer system, or combination
thereof, on which export controls are in effect under this Act, and which will
have been installed for end-use outside the United States in a quantity exceed-
ing 100,000 units over a 12-month period,
Id. at 8.
245. Id. § 5, at 10-11.
For purposes of this subsection, the term 'proliferation end-user' means any
entity that is engaged, directly or indirectly, in the design, development, or
production of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons or missiles and is lo-
cated in a country that is not party to a bilateral or multilateral agreement the
purpose of which is to limit the spread of such weapons and activities to which
the United States is a party.
Id.
246. Id. If the Secretary of Commerce fails to publish the proliferation end user,
however, exporters may assume that the end user is not a proliferation end-user. Id. at
11.
247. H.R. 3431, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). The short title of this bill is the
"Computer and Communications Trade Freedom Act." Id. at 1. House Bill, 3431, only
has a one percent chance of passing the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Bira,
CAS (103d Cong. 1993-94), available in Westlaw, BC Database. House Bill 3431 was also
introduced in the Senate as the "High Technology Export Reform Act," S. 1617, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). There is only a four percent chance S. 1617 will pass the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. BnlzAsr (103d Cong. 1993-94),
available in Westlaw, BC Database.
248. H.RL 3431 § 3, at 3-6.
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labelled as a terrorist country2 49 nor subject to a U.S. em-
bargo, 50 this bill would dispose of the validated license require-
ment for the export of computers and telecommunications
equipment to Russia.25'
2. Deregulation of Encryption Software
An additional bill pending to amend the EAA involves the
deregulation of encryption software.2 52  Data encryption
software allows a user to scramble a computer message into a
form that prevents an unauthorized user from interpreting the
contents of the message. 253 Until the past decade, encryption
software was only used for defense purposes,254 but as the need
for security in commercial systems increased, cryptography be-
came necessary for general uses.255
Although some encryption exports are controlled by the De-
partment of Commerce, through its maintenance of the CCL,256
encryption exports are also controlled under the U.S. Munitions
List,25 7 which is regulated by the Department of State. 25 1 The
U.S. Munitions List was established under the Arms Export Con-
249. See 59 Fed. Reg. 51,130, 51,131 (1994) (listing Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Lybia, North
Korea, Sudan, and Syria as terrorist countries).
250. Telephone Interview with Rodger Caringan, Licensing Officer, U.S. Depart-
ment of State, Economic and Business Bureau-Economic and Sanctions Policy (Mar. 7,
1994) (confirming that Russia is not subject to U.S. trade embargo nor is Russia subject
to U.N. embargo in which United States is participating).
251. See H.R. 3431 § 3, at 3-6 (eliminating validated license requirement for all
computer exports to all destinations that are not subject to embargo or labelled terror-
ist destination).
252. H.R. 3627, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
253. Ira S. Rubenstein, Export Contro/, on Encyption Software, in COPIN WrrH Ex.
PORT CONTROLS 1994, at 177, 181 (PU Comm. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series
No. 705, 1994). Messages are scrambled through encryption and descrambled through
decryption. Id. at 182. Encryption algorithms, the mathematical function used for
scrambling and descrambling messages, prevent unauthorized users from intercepting
a confidential message. Id.
254. Id. Cryptography aided the U.S. government in intelligence gathering and
securing information. Id.
255. Id. With the growth of business computerized networks, encryption software
has become a routine business precaution. Id.
256. 15 C.F.R. § 799.1 (Supp. 1 1994).
257. 22 C.F.R. § 121.1. The U.S. Munitions List controls the exportation of de-
fense materials such as bombs, grenades, missiles, tanks, aircraft and protective equip-
ment. I& The Munitions List also controls cryptographic equipment and software. I&
258. 22 C.F.R. § 121.1.
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trol Act ("AECA7). 259 The AECA gives the President the power
to control the import and export of defense articles and serv-
ices. 260
In November 1993, Representative Maria Cantwell [D-WA]
proposed House Bill 3627261 to amend the EAA to prohibit the
requirement of a validated license for encryption software that is
generally available26 2 for commercial use.26 3 In addition, House
Bill 3627 seeks to eliminate a validated license requirement for
all other software that is generally available. 2 4 Furthermore, this
amendment would place encryption software under the exclu-
sive control of the Department of Commerce although most en-
cryption software is currently controlled under the Munitions
List.
26 5
Deregulation of encryption software has yielded considera-
ble response from Congress266 and the Clinton Administra-
tion.267 In early 1994, the Clinton Administration conducted an
interagency review of encryption technology.28 Much of the re-
view focused on the use of the key escrow chip,26 9 ("clipper
259. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a) (1) (1988 and Supp. V 1993).
260. Id.
261. H.R. 3627, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). House Bill 3627 has only has a one
percent chance of passing the House Committee on Foreign Affiirs. BnjzAsr (103d
Cong. 1993-94), availab in Westlaw, BC Database.
262. H.R. 3627 § 1, at 3.
[T]he term 'generally available' means, in the case of software (including
software with encryption capabilities), software that is offered for sale, license,
or transfer to any person without restriction through any commercial means,
including, but not limited to, over-the-counter retail sales, mail order transac-
tions, phone order transactions, electronic distribution, or sale on ap-
proval ....
Id.
263. Id. at 2-3.
264. Id. at 2.
265. Id. at 1-2. Under House Bill 3627, the Secretary of Commerce would not
control encryption software used for military or intelligence purposes. Id. at 2.
266. See Export Controls on Mass Market Software: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Exo-
nomic Policy, Trade and Environment of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 103d Cong., 1st.
Sess. (1993) (hereinafter Software Hearings] (providing Congress with information on
effect U.S. controls on encryption and other software have on U.S. economy).
267. See Statement of the Press Secretary, The White House Office of the Press
Secretary, Feb. 4, 1994, at 2 [hereinafter Press Secretary] (discussing results of Adminis-
tration's review on encryption).
268. Id. Much of the review involved the problems of encryption software in the
United States and the fear that while cryptography helps U.S. businesses protect com-
pany secrets, it can also be used to further criminal activities. Id. at 2-3.
269. Id.
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chip") a split-key encryption system that offers tamper-proof se-
curity for computer activity over phone lines. °70 In an attempt to
resolve the debate over exporting encryption software, the Clin-
ton Administration proposes to permit the exportation of the
clipper chip.27'
House Bill 3937272 provides an alternative response to the
increasing concerns over controls on encryption software.273
House Bill 3937 would require the U.S. President to perform an
assessment of the encryption software market.274 In conducting
the assessment, the President shall review the types, quality, and
market penetration of encryption software produced outside the
Unites States and consider the economic impact of encryption
export controls on U.S. businesses. 275 Legislators seek to use the
President's findings to revise U.S. export policy on encryption
software.276
3. Proposal to Redraft the EAA in its Entirety
In addition to addressing exportation of encryption
software, House Bill 3937 offers legislation that would fully revise
the EAA.277 Primarily, House Bill 3937 seeks to improve multi-
lateral cooperation for export controls on dual-use technol-
ogy.27' House Bill 3937 would also amend the foreign availabil-
ity provision of the EAA279 to require the Secretary of Commerce
to conduct an annual review of controlled commodities.8 In
addition, House Bill 3937 would require the Secretary of Com-
270. Rubenstein, supra note 253, at 217. The U.S. government intends to hold the
"keys" for systems using the split key dipper chip. I& at 217-18.
271. Press Secretary, supra note 267, at 2.
272. H.R. 3937, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). This bill has already passed the
House Committee on Foreign affairs and has a 98% chance of passing the House floor
and a 94% chance of passing on the Senate floor. Bi.LcAST (103d Cong. 1993-94),
available in Westlaw, BC Database.
273. H.R. 3937 § 117, at 247.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 247-48.
276. H.R. REP. No. 531, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., Pt. 2, at 3 (1994).
277. H.R. 3937, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). The bill is entitled the Export Ad-
ministration Act of 1994. Id
278. Id. § 102, at 6. House Bill 3937 presumes that unilateral controls generally do
not prevent controlled countries from obtaining controlled commodities. I& House
Bill 3937, therefore, seeks to increase the effectiveness of multilateral controls. Id-
§ 103, at 9.
279. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(f) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
280. H.R. 3937 § 105, at 47-49.
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merce to report all allegations of controlled commodities avail-
able from non-U.S. sources to the U.S. Congress and the steps
taken to address the allegations.281 The responsibilities of the
Secretary of Commerce would also include conducting periodic
reviews of computer equipment and technology to determine
when advances in computer technology make certain export
controls obsolete.282
D. The Debate Over Deregulation of Exports to Russia
The bills seeking to deregulate export controls on dual-use
technology have yielded additional documentation highlighting
the debate over decontrolling exports to Russia and other na-
tions.283 Those with economic interests at stake, such as U.S.
technological companies, favor decontrol. 4 In contrast, those
concerned with U.S. security interests, such as the National Se-
curity Agency8 5 ("NSA"), oppose deregulating controls on ex-
ports to Russia.28 6
281. Id. at 45.46.
282. Id. at 50-56.
283. See, e.g., Telecommunications Hearings, supra note 9 (presenting arguments for
and against deregulating export controls on telecommunications equipment to former
Soviet Union); Export Control and High Technology: Hearing before the Subcomr. on Technol-
ogy, Environment and Aviation of House Comm. on Science, Space and Technology, lOSd Cong.,
2d Sess. (1994) [hereinafter Technology Hearings] (describing benefits and national se-
curity concerns that arise due to deregulating high-technology export controls).
284. See, e.g., TelecommunicationsHearings, supra note 9, at 13-16 (testimony of Rob-
ert Allen, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer, AT&T) (testifying that
Cold War export controls will jeopardize millions of dollars in telecommunications
sales to Russia).
285. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (1981). The establishment of
the National Security Agency ("NSA") and other U.S. government intelligence opera-
tions was authorized by the National Security Act of 1947. Id.; ch. 343, 61 Stat. 495
(1947) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 401-32 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). The
Department of Defense is responsible for operating and controlling the NSA. 46 Fed.
Reg. 59,946-47. The NSA is responsible for establishing, operating, and controlling
signal intelligence activities and collecting information for counterintelligence pur-.
poses. Id. at 59,947-48.
286. See Dual Personality, supra note 19, at 116 (stating that NSA is opposed to der-
egulating telecommunications exports to Russia because developing Russia's communi-
cation networks makes it more difficult to monitor activities of Russian government);
Telecommunications Hearings, supra note 9, at 16-18 (testimony of Lt. Gen. Lincoln
Faurer (retired), Former Director of the National Security Agency) (stating that
changes in export controls that weaken NSA's abilities to collect intelligence material
are harmful to U.S. national interests, and that instability in Russia demands surveil-
lance and gradual change in export controls).
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1. The Economic Argument for Deregulation of Exports
The arguments in favor of deregulating export of dual-use
items to Russia are presented in House Bill 2912 the bill to liber-
alize export controls on telecommunications to Russia and the
former Eastern Bloc. 287 According to the congressional findings
section of this House Bill 2912,288 deregulation would enhance
democratic initiatives in Russia, contribute to U.S. economic
competitiveness, eliminate outdated export restrictions, and al-
low U.S. companies to export materials currently available from
other sources. 8 9
Further arguments for decontrol are enumerated in House
Bill 3431.290 First, telecommunications and computer equip-
ment and technology exports account for more than eighty-five
percent of the value of exports controlled by the Department of
Commerce under the EAA.29 1 Second, the computer and tele-
communications industries account for 12.3% of all of the ex-
port trade in the United States and represent over 850,000 U.S.
jobs.29 2 Third, the rapid pace of technological development has
287. H.R. 2912, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. (1993).
288. Id. § 1, at 1-2.
289. Id&
(a) The Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The free exchange of ideas and information through modem, relia-
ble telecommunications equipment fosters the development of democratic in-
stitutions, the promotion of free market economic reforms, and the facilita-
tion of international commerce.
(2) Exports of advanced telecommunications equipment and technology
contribute to United States economic competitiveness and high-skill, high
wage jobs in the United States.
(3) Export restrictions on telecommunications equipment and technol-
ogy are outdated, controlling the export of equipment and technology that is
more than 10 years old and has over 15 times less capacity than similar equip-
ment and technology in use today in the United States.
(4) Foreign availability of telecommunications equipment and technol-
ogy exists both from countries that do not belong to or cooperate with the
Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls, and from within
countries to which export of such equipment and technology are controlled
by the agreement of the Coordinating Committee.
Id.
290. H.R. 3431, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). House Bill 3431 seeks to eliminate
the requirement of a validated license for computer and telecommunications exports to
Russia and all other nations not subject to an embargo or repeatedly involved in acts of
international terrorism. Id. § 3, at 3-6.
291. Id. § 2, at 1-2.
292. Id. at 2.
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rendered export controls meaningless, 293 and finally, the availa-
bility of controlled exports from COCOM and non-COCOM
countries poses a great disadvantage to the U.S. technological
industry, thereby damaging the U.S. economy.2 94
These congressional findings are largely based on the testi-
mony from representatives of U.S. technological industries who
have appeared before Congress to encourage the U.S. govern-
ment to change its policies on export controls.295 Companies
such as AT&T assert that export controls on telecommunications
equipment to Russia will effect millions of U.S. dollars in sales
over the next five years as Russia is expected to be one of the
world's largest telecommunications markets. 296 AT&T claims
this translates into U.S. jobs as they must increase revenues by
five to ten percent yearly to maintain current employment
levels.297 Similarly, producers of encryption software argue that
the demand for encryption technology is so widespread that ex-
ports controls could cost U.S. software companies billions in rev-
enue.
298
In addition to the economic incentives, advocates of export
deregulation argue that certain controls are meaningless as Rus-
sia can receive restricted U.S. technologies from non-U.S.
sources.299 Most European countries do not regulate the expor-
293. I&
294. I at 2-3.
295. See EAA Hearings, supra note 9, at 17-39 (statements of Paul Freedenberg on
behalf of Computers, Business Equipment and Manufacturer's Association, Richard
Lehmann, IBM Corp.; Boyd McKelvain, General Electric; and David Danjczek, Litton
Industries); Technology Hearings, supra note 283, at 39 (testimony of Carol E. Henton,
Manager, Corporate Export Administration Department, Varian Assoc., Inc., represent-
ing semi-conductor equipment); Telecommunications Hearings, supra note 9, at 13 (testi-
mony of Robert E. Allen, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer, AT&T).
296. I& at 14-15 (testimony of Robert E. Allen). In some areas of the former So-
viet Union there are two telephone lines per 100 people, compared to the United States
where on average there are 50 phone lines per 100 people. Id. at 15. Furthermore,
Russian President Boris Yeltsin has expressed a strong interest in acquiring Western
technology to revitalize the Russian economy. Alam, supra note 10, at 143.
297. Telecommunications Hearings, supra note 9, at 15 (testimony of Robert E. Al-
len).
298. Software Hearings, supra note 266, at 8 (testimony by Raymond Ozzie, IRIS
Associates, representing the Business Software Association) (stating US$6-9 billion of
revenue are at risk because of demands for controlled encryption software).
299. Cold War Controls, supra note 126, at 291. For example, Israel, which was not a
member of COCOM, was legally able to sell advanced telecommunications equipment
to China while the U.S. government prohibited U.S. companies from doing so. Id.
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tation of encryption software.300  Since the fall of the Soviet
Union, Japan and Western European countries have exported
dual-use technologies to Russia more frequently and on a larger
scale than the United States. 01 With the dissolution of
COCOM, U.S. high-technology companies are increasingly con-
cerned that the United States will impose stricter controls than
other former COCOM members, allowing restricted destinations
to obtain the controlled commodities while hindering U.S. com-
petitiveness in international markets.
8 0 2
Deregulation of dual-use technology exports is further sup-
ported by the fact that the threat of the Russian military's con-
ventional forces has subsided.30 3 The declining defense budget
has resulted in the reduction and relocation of Russian military
forces.30 4 Budget cuts have also led to a drop in equipment
modernization of conventional weapons by the Russian govern-
ment.3 05
Finally, proponents of deregulation assert that Russian ac-
cess to technology aids democratic initiatives.8 06 Advanced tele-
communications is a prerequisite for economic development in
Russia30 7 and the free flow of information propels democratic
movements.5 08 Proponents, therefore, argue that controlling ex-
ports to Russia actually hinders U.S. policy objectives to assist the
evolving democratic, capitalist governments in the former Soviet
300. Encyption Foreign Availability: How Much Evidence Do You Need?, EXPORT CON.
TROL NEws, July, 31, 1994, available in Westlaw, Allnews Database. The Software Pub-
lishers Association confirmed that encryption software programs are produced in 78
countries including Australia, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Israel, Switzerland, and the
United Kingdom. Id. Many of the companies in these countries export the encryption
software throughout the world. Id.
301. Alam, supra note 10, at 145.
302. See Technology Hearings, supra note 283, at 46-47 (statement of Carol Henton,
Manager, Corporate Export Administration Department, Varian Assoc., Inc.) (stating
that only multilateral export controls are effective and unilateral controls only harm
U.S. industries).
303. Security Hearings, supra note 18, at 23 (prepared statement of Lt. Gen. James
R. Clapper, Jr., USAF, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency).
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. See Cold War Controls, supra note 126, at 288 (stating that it is no coincidence
that secure democracies have advanced telecommunication infrastructures).
307. Telecommunications Hearings, supra note 9, at 11 (testimony of Lawrence
Eagleburger of Baker, Worthington, Corssley, Stansberry Law Offices, and former Act-
ing Secretary of State).
308. Id. at 14 (testimony of Robert E. Allen).
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2. Supporting Export Controls: The National Security
Argument
Despite the potential benefits of decontrolling the exporta-
tion of computer and telecommunication technology, others op-
pose deregulation based on national security concerns.310 This
opposition is based on the presumption that Russia's economic
and political instability requires the United States to retain a
more restrictive export policy toward Russia.31 1 Although oppo-
nents of deregulation recognize various dual-use technologies
are available from non-U.S. sources, they argue that the United
States should not contribute to the proliferation of sensitive
technology.3 12
The ability to monitor other nations is a necessary part of
U.S. security.313 As the NSA is responsible for decoding signals
of foreign governments and collecting information for counter-
intelligence purposes, 14 the NSA fears that advancing Russia's
telephone network would make it more difficult to monitor
them during times of peace and harder to disrupt the network
during times of war or unrest.315 For example, advanced fiber-
optic telecommunications could link Russia's government and
defense installations and hamper U.S. surveillance efforts be-
cause coded transmissions over fiber cables cannot be moni-
309. Cold War' Controls, supra note 126, at 288.
310. See Morillo, supra note 16, at 1120 (noting U.S. President Clinton has been
criticized for emphasizing economic benefits of deregulating dual-use exports at ex-
pense of national security).
311. See Teletommunications Hearings, supra note 9, at 18 (testimony of Lt. Gen. Lin-
coin Faurer (retired), Former Director of the National Security Agency) (stating that
political instability in Russia demands watchfulness and gradual deregulation of export
controls); Nitze, supra note 20, at 483-84 (recognizing that political instability in Russia
yields uncertainty as to whom will control its vast arsenal).
312. U.S. CONGRmS, OmcE oF TEcHNOLOGCAL ASSESSMENT, 103D CONG. 2D SESS.,
ExPoRT CoNmToLs AD NONPROLTMATON PouCV 56 (1994). Supporters of unilateral
export controls argue that deregulating controls simply because they are available from
other sources is analogous to selling a gun to a criminal just because the criminal can
buy it elsewhere. I.
313. See Software Hearings, supra note 266, at 11 (testimony of Stephen T. Walker,
President, Trusted Information Systems, Inc.) (stating that limiting availability of cryp-
tography is necessary for United States to spy on adversaries).
314. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941, 59,947-48 (1981).
315. Dual Personality, supra note 19, at 116.
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tored. 16
The NSA is also opposed to the deregulation of encryption
software"1 7 as cryptography hinders the ability of the United
States to monitor international communications.3 18 As the
proliferation of software programs with advanced encryption al-
gorithms increases, 1 9 the NSA's ability to listen to communica-
tions of other governments decreases.3 20 Encryption software
also enables U.S. adversaries, terrorists, and spies to keep com-
munications secret from the NSA. 2 ' Furthermore, the world-
wide use of encryption enhances the ability to develop offensive
weapons to attack U.S. communications systems.322
Those concerned with national security have also asserted
that the economic benefits of deregulation may only yield a
short-term benefit that will be outweighed by increased military
spending in the long run. 23 High-speed computers, for exam-
ple, which have numerous civilian uses, can also enhance nu-
clear weapon systems. 3 24 Iraq is a prime example.3 25 In export-
ing U.S. dual-use items to civilian industries in Iraq, the United
States enabled the Iraqi government to produce sophisticated
weapons systems ranging from ballistic missiles to nuclear weap-
ons.3 26 Because of these exports, the United States spent billions
in defense dollars fighting the Gulf War.3 27 Similarly, opponents
of deregulation are fearful that the Russian arsenal could benefit
316. Peter Behr & Thomas W. Lippman, Fiber-Optic Sales to Russia Promote Debate,
WASH. Posr, Jan. 6, 1994, at D1O.
317. See SoftwareHearings, supra note 266, at 1 (statement of Rep. Sam Gejdenson)
(indicating NSA seeks to regulate exports on software that is mass-marketed in United
States).
318. I at 11 (testimony of Stephen T. Walker, President, Trusted Information
Systems, Inc.); see Robert T. Nelson, Software Firms, NSA Battle Over Exports, SxA'rLE
TIMES, Feb. 2, 1994, at DI (reporting NSA opposes exporting encryption software be-
cause cryptography impairs efforts of U.S. spies).
319. See Rubenstein, supra note 253, at 182. A cryptographic algorithm is the
mathematical function used in encryption software. i
320. Charles E. Evans, Comment, U.S. Export Control ofEncryption Software: Efforts to
Protect National Security Threaten the U.S. Software Industy's Abiliy to Compete in Foreign
Markets, 19 N.C.J. INT'L & CoM. REG. 469, 486 (1994).
321. i at 487.
322. Id. at 488.
323. Morillo, supra note 16, at 1122.
324. Id. at 1121.
325. See id. at 1121 (describing how U.S. exports to Iraq developed Iraqi arsenal).
326. Id.
327. Id.
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from advanced technology. 2
Opponents also assert that deregulating export controls cre-
ates enforcement concerns. 29 Although the EAA has strict li-
censing and enforcement provisions,"' the United States has
not been always been able to determine if the exporter knows
the civilian export will be used for proliferation activities.33 1
Those concerned with national security fear that relaxation of
export controls of goods intended for civilian use will result in
the diversion of these goods for military purposes.3 3 2
III. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS DICTATE THE UNITED
STATES SHOULD CONTINUE TO CONTROL THE
EXPORTATION OF DUAL-USE
TECHNOLOGY TO RUSSIA
Russia's political transformation 3 3 invites the elimination of
export controls that were implemented due to the Cold War. 34
The United States, however, should continue to limit deregulat-
ing export controls to Russia because the current state of Russia
continues to pose threats to U.S. security interests.335 At the
same time, the United States cannot ignore the costs export con-
trols place on U.S. technological industries.33 6 The disbanding
of COCOM and the intention to establish a new multilateral ex-
port regime3 3 7 present the United States with the opportunity to
328. See Alam, supra note 10, at 146 (noting opponents of deregulation are fearful
Russia will qualitatively enhance their military capabilities). The Russian government's
arsenal includes 27,000 nuclear warheads. Security Hearings, supra note 18, at 22.
329. Morillo, supra note 16, at 1121.
330. See OvERvmw OF EXPORT CONTRoLs, supra note 26, at 67-80.
331. Morillo, supra note 16, at 1121.
332. See Alam, supra note 10, at 146 (noting that Russia has made quantitative
cutbacks in its arsenal, but possibility that Western technology wili qualitatively upgrade
remaining weapons still exists).
333. See Clines, supra note 8 (reporting on disbanding of Soviet Union in Decem-
ber 1991).
334. See supra notes 29.40 and accompanying text (describing unilateral and multi-
lateral export controls imposed to prevent Soviet Union from dual-use technology).
335. See supra notes 153-92 and accompanying text (discussing political and eco-
nomic instabilities in Russia, influence of ultra-nationalist leaders, and Russia's nation-
alistic external policies).
336. See Telecommunications Hearings, supra note 9, at 14-15 (testimony of Robert E.
Allen, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of AT&T) (stating U.S. com-
panies may lose billions of dollars in revenue if export controls toward Russia and other
former communist nations continue).
337. Launching New Regime, supra note 196, at 1634.
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create an export policy toward Russia that addresses both eco-
nomic and national security concerns.
A. Threats to National Security That Arise from Russian Access to
Dual-Use Technologies
During the Cold War, the United States limited exports of
dual-use technologies to Russia to prevent the Russians from en-
hancing their military capabilities, to further intelligence gather-
ing, and to hinder Russian economic development.3 38 In many
respects, these rationales for limiting exports of dual-use com-
modities remain. As Russia is politically unstable,33 9 surveillance
efforts are an important aspect of national security. The political
environment in Russia also creates the possibility of the Russian
government using Western technology to enhance their military
capabilities.340 Moreover, the United States seeks to frustrate
corrupt activities that threaten the development of a capitalist
economy in Russia.- 41
1. Dual-Use Exports Impair U.S. Surveillance Efforts
Eliminating export controls on telecommunications equip-
ment and encryption technology makes it increasingly difficult
for the United States to monitor activities in Russia.3 4 2  With
Yeltsin's popularity on the decline 43 and ultra-nationalists gain-
ing power,3" the future leadership of Russia is unclear.
Although Russia is no longer the military superpower it once
338. Telecommunications Hearings, supra note 9, at 9-10. (testimony of Lawrence
Eagleburger of Baker, Worthington, Corssley, Stansberry Law Offices, and former Act-
ing Secretary of State).
339. See supra notes 153-66 and accompanying text (describing lack of support for
Yeltsin and influence of Ultra-Nationalist Party).
340. See Galuska, supra note 166, at 56 (reporting on popularity of Zhirinovsky and
his desire to enhance Russian defense industries).
341. See CRIME AND CORRUTION iN RussiA, supra note 135 (describing current state
of Russia as nation plagued with organized crime and corrupt activities).
342. See Dual Personality, supra note 19, at 116 (explaining NSA is opposed to de-
regulation of export controls on telecommunications equipment because advanced
telecommunications system is harder to monitor); Software Hearings, supra note 266, at
11 (stating cryptography cripples ability of United States to monitor international com-
munications).
343. See Hiatt, supra note 155, at A20 (reporting that only eight percent of Rus-
sians support Yeltsin).
344. See Policy Toward NIS, supra note 17, at 1 (stating Ultra-Nationalist Party is
largest political bloc in Russian parliament).
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was,s  the Russian arsenal contains 27,000 nuclear warheads. 46
In order to preserve national security, the United States must
have the ability to monitor political activity to determine who
will ultimately control the Russian nuclear arsenal.
Even if Yeltsin remains in power, the United States must
have the capabilities to watch Russia closely. As Yeltsin has con-
templated authoritarian measures,3 47 asserted a nationalistic
agenda, and encouraged Russian defense contractors to market
their goods abroad, 4 ' U.S. surveillance efforts are necessary to
monitor the activities of the Russian government. In addition,
Yeltsin's establishment of the Ministry of Security requires the
United States to have the abilities to counter Russian surveil-
lance efforts. 49
2. Dual-Use Exports Can Facilitate the Development of the
Russian Arsenal
As highlighted by the Toshiba-Kongsberg affair,35 0 the ex-
portation of dual-use technologies can also provide Russia with
the ability to enhance their military capabilities.351 While in the-
ory the United States can limit the exports to civilian end users,
as seen with Iraq, exporting dual-use commodities enables the
receiving government to use the technology for military pur-
poses.3 52 Allowing U.S. industries to export telecommunications
and computer equipment for limited purposes,53 therefore,
does not diminish the possibility that the technology will be di-
verted for restricted use.
345. See Security Hearings, supra note 18, at 23 (stating Russia's conventional forces
have weakened and pose smaller threat to United States than during Cold War).
346. Id. at 22.
347. Cohen, supra note 17, at 373.
348. Efron, supra note 186, at 8.
349. See Trimble, supra note 167, at 42 (reporting that Russian Ministry of Security
is run by former KGB agents who intend to spy on Western nations).
350. See supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text (exhibiting how violations of
export controls can harm U.S. national security interests).
351. See Kenner & Russell, supra note 110, at 623 & n.6 (explaining how exporting
dual-use technology to Russia enabled Russia to enhance ability of their submarines to
evade radar).
352. Morillo, supra note 16, at 1121 (discussing how United States encouraged ex-
portation of sensitive technology to Iraq).
353. See 15 C.F.R. § 771.20 (c). The GLX is not available for items subject to mis-
sile technology or nuclear proliferation controls and only encompasses exports to civil
end users for civilian uses. MeL
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Political instabilities present various scenarios where Russia
may divert dual-use technologies. First, if Yeltsin is overthrown,
an ultra-nationalist leader will have access to dual-use technolo-
gies to produce more sophisticated weapons.3 54 In this worst
case scenario, the short term economic benefit of deregulating
exports will be replaced by long term expenditures of fighting
another Cold War, or in the worst case scenario, a conventional
war."' Second, if Yeltsin adopts a more authoritarian, national-
istic agenda, the chances of Yeltsin developing the Russian arse-
nal increase . 56 Enhancing Russia's military capabilities will be-
come necessary if Yeltsin continues to pursue actions compara-
ble to engaging war with the Republic of Chechnya.35 7
Economic instability in Russia also increases the likelihood
that the Russians will sell weapons and technology to other na-
tions to increase revenue. 58 The Russians have already at-
tempted to sell arms to India 59 and continue to transfer arms to
Iran. 60 If this behavior continues, exporting dual-use technol-
ogy to Russia will not only enhance the Russian arsenal but these
technologies will in effect enhance the military capabilities of
other countries whose policy objectives are counter to those of
the United States.
3. Dual-Use Exports Foster Corruption
Exporting computers and telecommunications does not aid
in developing capitalist markets in Russia because Russia's econ-
omy is plagued by organized crime.3 6' While telecommunica-
tions technology and encryption software can help develop legit-
imate businesses, they also provide the means' to further en-
354. See Galuska, supra note 166, at 56 (reporting Zhirinovsky seeks to rebuild Rus-
sia's defense industries).
355. See Morillo, supra note 16, at 1121-22 (citing Iraq as example that short term
economic benefits of exports was outweighed by costs of fighting full-fledged War).
356. See Hockstader, supra note 159, at A28 (reporting that Yeltsin's decision to
wage war on Chechnya caused Yeltsin to lose support from Russian democrats who see
Yeltsin's decision to send troops Chechnya as authoritarian measure).
357. IM
358. See supra notes 173-77 and accompanying text (describing substantial eco-
nomic instability in Russia).
359. Policy Toward NIS, supra note 17, at 34.
360. See Russia in New Regime, supra note 210, at 5 (indicating U.S. concern over
1988 Russian arms contract with Iran).
361. See CIME AND CO.urMON IN RussiA, supra note 135 (stating corruption in
Russia has permeated economy and politics).
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hance criminal activity in Russia.36 2 In order to develop a more
stable economy in Russia, the United States must limit exports
that enhance the capabilities of criminals to threaten capitalist
endeavors in Russia.
The extensive corruption has also caused the Russian peo-
ple to be wary of democracy and capitalism.36 3 As corruption
continues, so does the likelihood of the Russian people embrac-
ing an authoritarian government. 364 In order to stifle the trend
toward authoritarianism, the United States cannot pursue an ex-
port policy that ignores the influence organized crime has on
Russian politics and the Russian people.
B. Balancing the Competing Interests
Although the Russian government poses extensive security
concerns, the economic arguments for deregulating export con-
trols cannot be ignored. The United States must address the
ability of Russia to obtain controlled dual-use technologies from
non-U.S. sources.3 6 5 At the same time, the United States should
continue to encourage programs that can develop democracy
and capitalism in Russia while enabling the United States to have
a healthy trade relationship with Russia in the future.
1. Addressing the Concerns of U.S. Businesses
Two bills pending in Congress seek to balance economic in-
terests with national security. House Bill 353466 and House Bill3937367 propose legislation that attempts to alleviate controls on
dual-use technologies that is available from other sources while
recognizing the need to maintain controls for security purposes.
Through requiring the Secretary of Commerce to conduct yearly
reviews on technology export controls and indicating the rea-
sons for controls, House Bill 3534 imposes greater accountability
362. See Press Secretary supra note 267, at 2-3 (indicating concerns over exporting
encryption software as encryption devices can help further criminal activity).
363. CRME AND CoRRurnoN IN RussIA, supra note 135, at 5 (statement of Dr. Lou-
ise Shelly).
364. See id. at 5-6 (indicating Russian people lived in nearly corruption-free society
before democratization, and manner in which Russians appraise democracy directly im-
pacts on ability of authoritarian leaders to gain control).
365. See supra notes 292-302 (noting extent of controlled dual-use technologies
available to Russia outside United States).
366. H.R. 3534, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
367. H.R. 3937, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
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on the Administration without asserting where controls should
be lifted. 68 Similarly, House Bill 3937 requires more stringent
and more frequent assessments of technology available from
non-U.S. sources.3 69 This type of legislation avoids removing
controls where similar, but not as powerful or comprehensive
technology, is available from sources outside the United States
while preserving U.S. competitiveness in international markets.
Multilateral cooperation is essential if the United States
seeks to control a particular commodity that is available world-
wide. As a new multilateral export regime is scheduled to
form, 7 ° the United States will have the opportunity to present
the reasons for retaining controls on dual-use exports to Russia.
If multilateral cooperation is achieved, the United States main-
tains enforcement mechanisms under the Multilateral Export
Control Enhancement Amendments Act071 to impose sanctions
on those countries illegally transferring dual-use technology to
Russia.37 2
The United States, however, must continue to exercise uni-
lateral controls to Russia in limited instances. Even if an export
is widely available from non-U.S. sources, the United States must
prevent exporting technology that is critical to U.S. security in-
terests. In these limited circumstances, the United States must
consider the global impact of contributing to the proliferation of
sensitive technology before considering the economic benefits.
Although the instability in Russia requires the United States
to continue to limit exports of dual-use technology to Russia, the
United States should continue to develop economic opportuni-
ties in other former communist nations. As Hungary, Poland,
and the Czech Republic are establishing political and economic
institutions comparable to those of Western countries,373 the
United States has the opportunity to develop viable trade rela-
tionships with these nations. U.S. businesses can develop these
markets with few restrictions as most of the exports controls to
368. H.R. 3534 § 2, at 2-7.
369. H.R. 3937 § 105, at 45-49.
370. Launching New Regime, supra note 196, at 1634.
371. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410a (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
372. I& §§ 2410a(a), 2410a(h).
373. McKenzie, supra note 3, at 7.
DUAL-USE EXPORTS TO RUSSIA
Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic have been lifted.3 74
Although the potential markets in these countries are less exten-
sive than the economic opportunities in Russia, the current situ-
ation in Russia would require the United States to risk national
security in exchange for economic gains.
2. A Viable Export Policy Toward Russia
In order to develop a viable trade relationship with Russia in
the future, the United States must pursue policies that foster
these initiatives. Admitting Russia into the new multilateral ex-
port control regime will allow the United States to have greater
control over Russia's proliferation activities. Once the United
States is assured that Russia is not diverting dual-use technolo-
gies to nations such as Iran,3s7 one of the major concerns over
decontrolling exports to Russia will have been addressed. In the
interim, the United States should continue to provide educa-
tional programs for Russian capitalists and democrats7 6 and en-
courage U.S. investment in civilian industries in Russia through
the U.S.-Russia Business Development Committee. ' These pro-
grams will promote economic and political stability while coun-
tering nationalism and anti-Western sentiments in Russia.
CONCLUSION
As the Cold War has come to an end, the United States is
looking for ways to build ties with Russia' and open economic
opportunities that were closed for over forty years. The allevia-
tion of export controls on dual-use technology to Russia appears.
to achieve those goals. Russia's inability to establish a stable re-
gime, however, creates a variety of U.S. security concerns. To
address the competing objectives of economic opportunites with
374. See 15 C.F.R. § 799.1 (Supp. 11994) (indicating dual-use exports to Poland,
Hungary, and Czech Republic are likely to be approved).
375. See Launching New Regime, supra note 196, at 1634 (stating Russian member-
ship in new regime is contingent on rescinding Russian arms contract with Iran).
Countries expected to participate in the new regime have agreed to control exports to
pariah nations. Allies Firm Up List, supra note 212, at 1922.
376. See Policy Toward MS, supra note 17, at 49 (discussing program where mem-
bers of Russian parliament study democratic process with U.S. congressional counter-
parts). The United States also invites Russian entreprenuers to receive training and
education in the United States. Id. at 25.
377. See supra notes 220-22 and accompanying text (describing activities of Busi-
ness Development Committee to promote investment and trade with Russia).
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national security, the U.S. Congress must amend the EAA to re-
move controls on exports available to Russia from other coun-
tries while retaining export controls on sensitive dual-use tech-
nologies to Russia. Meanwhile, the Clinton Administration
should promote policies that foster democracy and capitalism in
Russia in order to enable U.S. industries to export dual-use tech-
nologies to Russia in the future without compromising U.S. se-
curity.
